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SUE ON PAY:
SAY ON PAY’S IMPACT ON DIRECTORS’
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Lisa M. Fairfax*

This Article advances a normative case for using say on pay litigation to enhance
the state courts’ role in policing directors’ compensation decisions. Outrage over
what many perceive to be excessive executive compensation has escalated
dramatically in recent years. In 2010, such outrage prompted Congress to
mandate say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation.
In the wake of say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought suit against
directors alleging that a negative vote indicates a breach of directors’ fiduciary
duties. To date, the vast majority of courts have rejected these suits. This Article
insists that such rejection represents a wasted opportunity, and argues that
Delaware courts should use say on pay litigation to alter how they assess board
duties related to pay practices for at least three reasons. First, empirical evidence
suggests that we cannot rely exclusively on say on pay to alter board behavior.
Second, if Delaware and other state courts fail to respond to calls for better
regulation of compensation practices, those courts risk further federal intrusion in
this area, which could undermine private-ordering along with value-enhancing
experimentation and innovation that can only occur at the state level. Third, say
on pay votes are an ideal vehicle for increasing state courts’ role not only because
courts should encourage boards to consider shareholder concerns but also
because negative say on pay votes may be a critical signal that there is a defect in
pay policies that needs to be addressed. Instead of being used as a tool to bypass
fiduciary duty law, say on pay should serve as a springboard for reinvigorating
such law as it pertains to executive compensation.

*
Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law, The George
Washington University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School.
Special thanks to Stephen Vladeck, Heather Hughes and the faculty of American University
Washington College of Law; Roger Fairfax, Michael Selmi, and the faculty at George
Washington University Law School; as well as Corinna Lain and the faculty at the
University of Richmond School of Law for their comments and insights on earlier versions
of this Article. All errors, of course, are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, executive compensation is one of the most controversial
corporate governance issues in recent years. 1 Both lawmakers and the general
public have expressed considerable outrage over what they view as excessive
executive compensation.2 Such outrage not only stems from a belief that there is an
insufficient link between executive pay and corporate performance but also from
concern about the widening gap between executive compensation and the pay of
average workers.3
Although American fury over executive compensation is not new, 4 it has
grown considerably amidst the financial crisis. And it has been fueled by stories of
executives receiving significant pay packages while their companies performed
poorly or received federal bailout funds. 5 Some have even insisted that excessive
executive pay played a role in fueling, or even precipitating, the financial crisis by

1.
See Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a
Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 201 (1996) (noting that the
public outcry over CEO pay has no parallel in sports or the movie business); Omari Scott
Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation
Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 302 (2009) (“No corporate governance issue captures the
imagination and frustration of the American public and politicians more than executive
compensation.”); Michael C. Jensen et al., Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got
to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch. NOM
Research Paper No. 04-28; European Corporate Governance Inst. Fin. Working Paper No.
44, 2004), available at http://www.cgscenter.org/library/board/remuneration.pdf (“Few
issues in the history of the modern corporation have attracted the international attention
garnered by what the largest corporations pay their top executives.”).
2.
See Michael M. Phillips, The AIG Controversy: ‘Outrage’ Overflows on
Capitol Hill as Lawmakers Denounce Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A4.
3.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Banker Bonuses Are
‘Shameful,’ Obama Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1; see also infra Part I.B.
4.
See Charles C. Pak, Toward Reasonable Executive Compensation: Outcry
for Reform and Regulatory Response, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 633, 633 (“Executive
compensation, or more appropriately, the overcompensation of executives, is the
controversial corporate governance topic of the 1990s.”); Jensen et al., supra note 1, at 29
(noting that executive compensation became a major political issue in the 1990s); see also
Harwell Wells, “No Man Can be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight over Executive
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 705–07 (2010).
5.
See THE CONFERENCE BD., THE CONFERENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6–7 (2009) (noting that “[e]xecutive compensation has become
a flashpoint for [the public’s] frustration and anger” and that the economic crisis “has only
intensified public anger over executive compensation”), available at http://www.
conference-board.org/pdf_free/execcompensation2009.pdf; Kenneth R. Davis, Taking
Stock—Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419,
419–21 (2010); Aaron Lucchetti & Matthew Karnitschnig, On Street, New Reality on Pay
Sets in, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2009, at B1 (noting that the five largest Wall Street firms paid
a total of $26 billion in bonuses in 2008, the same year that their companies lost a combined
$25.3 billion).
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incentivizing executives to pursue unjustifiably risky transactions. 6 Such stories
accelerated efforts to reform executive pay practices. 7
Say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation—
has garnered significant attention and support as a measure for curbing outsized
executive compensation.8 In 2009, the federal government mandated say on pay
for corporations receiving funding under the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(“TARP”).9 As a result, some 300 companies were required to provide annual say
on pay votes.10 In 2010, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd–Frank”) extended this requirement to all public
companies.11 The push to mandate say on pay stems from a belief that it could help
curtail inappropriate pay packages and practices, while holding directors more
accountable for their compensation decisions.12

6.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98
GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010); Jeremy Ryan Delman, Structuring Say-on-Pay: A Comparative
Look at Global Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 2010 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 583, 584; Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive
Compensation for Risk Regulation (Emory Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-93, Emory
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-60, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546229.
7.
See Deborah Solomon & Laura Meckler, Strict Executive-Pay Caps
Planned—Latest Salvo from Obama Administration Aims to Rein in Firms Receiving
Federal Aid, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at A3; Stolberg & Labaton, supra note 3 (noting
President Obama’s reference to Wall Street pay practices as “shameful”); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive
Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg15.aspx.
8.
See COMPENSIA, INC., THOUGHTFUL PAY ALERT: SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY
VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION—A “SAY ON PAY” PRIMER 1–2 (June 22, 2009)
(noting emphasis on say on pay and its popular appeal), available at
http://www.compensia.com/tp_alerts/ThoughtfulPay_SayOnPay_0609.pdf; Marcel Kahan
& Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1034–36 (2010).
9.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2012).
10.
See Robert W. Reeder III, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Compensation
Disclosure and Shareholder Activism, in HOT ISSUES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2009, at
139 (2009), available at www.pli.edu/emktg/toolbox/CompDis_ShareAct25.DOC; Rosanna
Weaver et al., A Closer Look at Executive Compensation, in RISKMETRICS GROUP
POSTSEASON REPORT 2009: A NEW VOICE IN GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL POLICYMAKERS SHAPE
THE ROAD TO REFORM 24, 24 (Oct. 2009), available at https://www.governance
exchange.com/repository/KnowledgeGateway/pubs/2009_PSR_Client_final.PDF.
11.
See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
111-203, sec. 951, § 14, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act]
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 (2012)).
12.
See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, “SAY ON PAY” SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY
VOTES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE NEW FRONTIER OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ACTIVISM 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub
2039_1.pdf; Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience
and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 337–50 (2009).
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Rather than join the numerous voices engaged in the debate over the
merits of say on pay,13 this Article examines how say on pay impacts boards’
fiduciary duties. Boards have been at the center of the executive pay controversy
because they bear responsibility for establishing and approving executive pay. 14
Indeed, if executive pay levels are excessive, then boards have inadequately
performed their obligations in this area. Some commentators even contend that
changes in CEO compensation will not occur unless boards become more
accountable.15 As a result, reforms often focus on enhancing board responsibility
and making directors more accountable for their compensation decisions. 16 For
purposes of corporate governance, fiduciary duty law represents the primary
accountability mechanism.17 Yet most commentators believe that such law,
particularly as articulated by Delaware courts, has been an inadequate constraint
on director behavior.18 In the realm of executive compensation, fiduciary duty law
has played little, if any, role in policing boards. This is because courts afford
considerable deference to boards’ executive compensation decisions, even
upholding executive compensation decisions characterized as “sloppy and
perfunctory.”19 Such deference creates the concern that fiduciary duty law has

13.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 12, at 352–53; Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on
Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 129–33 (2010).
14.
See infra Part I.D.
15.
See Barbara Hansen & Gary Strauss, Companies Think They’re
Worth . . . $100,000,000, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2006, at 1B (quoting Harvard Professor
Lucian Bebchuk).
16.
See infra Part II.B, Part II.C.
17.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1046 (1993) (noting that for most
scholars, fiduciary duty law enforced through shareholder litigation represents the primary
means of director accountability).
18.
See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 46 (2004) (“[A]lmost all cases since
1900 have refused to overturn compensation decisions made by the boards of publicly
traded firms.”); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 81–82, 98 (1992) (“In virtually every case since
the turn of the century, courts have either applied the business judgment rule and endorsed
the compensation practice, or simply thrown in the towel and refused to deal with the
problem.”); Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay:
Contractual Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1198 (2011) (noting that Delaware’s
standard of review had taken Delaware courts and corporate law “largely out of the policing
picture”); Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 215; Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells,
Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’
Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 855, 869 (2011). But see Thomas & Wells, supra,
at 865–80 (pinpointing instances where plaintiffs have had some success in challenging
executive compensation decisions, though most did not occur in Delaware and did not occur
at public companies).
19.
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249, 263 (Del. 2000).
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done little to ensure that directors comply with their obligation to ensure that
executives are paid at an appropriate level.20
This Article argues that say on pay can and should address this concern.
In the wake of say on pay votes, shareholders have filed several lawsuits against
directors in which they have relied on such votes to suggest that directors have
breached their fiduciary duties.21 Commentators and courts have insisted that
Dodd–Frank prohibits shareholders from using say on pay to reshape fiduciary
duty law.22 Moreover, commentators almost universally agree that such suits are
without merit and believe that say on pay does not and should not have any impact
on directors’ fiduciary duties.23 Appearing to confirm this assessment, courts have
almost universally chosen to dismiss suits in this area.24
This Article insists that courts should choose a different path. To be sure,
despite efforts aimed at enhancing director accountability for executive
compensation matters, the combination of executive compensation reforms likely
increases the difficulty of challenging director decision-making in this area and
thus of holding directors accountable through fiduciary duty rules. 25 Nevertheless,
this Article takes issue with the presumption that such suits should be construed as
meritless. In fact, recent Delaware jurisprudence strongly suggests that there are
circumstances (admittedly, very limited) under which shareholders may be
successful in fiduciary duty actions involving executive compensation. 26 Then too,
Dodd–Frank itself does include a provision indicating that such law is not designed
to alter state fiduciary duty law. 27 Yet this Article insists that while such a
provision may be viewed as a prohibition against compelling changes to fiduciary
duty law, it does not prevent courts from reassessing and reinvigorating such law.
More importantly, this Article argues that there are three reasons it may
prove advantageous for Delaware courts to use say on pay litigation to alter the
manner in which they assess board duties regarding pay. First, although say on pay
has the potential to alter and improve pay practices, empirical studies suggest that
it would be inappropriate to rely exclusively on say on pay to check director
behavior. Thus, fiduciary law is still necessary to cure problematic pay practices.
Second, if Delaware and other state courts fail to respond to calls for better
20.
Robert E. Scully, Jr., Executive Compensation, the Business Judgment Rule,
and the Dodd–Frank Act: Back to the Future for Private Litigation, FED. LAW., Jan. 2011,
at 36, 38.
21.
See infra Part III.B.
22.
See, e.g., SARAH A. GOOD ET AL., PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP,
PLAINTIFFS’ FIRMS GAINING STEAM IN NEW WAVE OF SAY-ON-PAY SHAREHOLDER SUITS? 3
(2012), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/plaintiffs-firms-gaining-steam-innew-w-03932/; Order Granting Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss the Compl., Teamsters Local 237
v. McCarthy, No. 2011-CV-197841 (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2011), 2011 WL 4836230
(indicating that fiduciary duty suits were not supported by Dodd–Frank’s language).
23.
GOOD ET AL., supra note 22, at 1.
24.
See id. at 2.
25.
See infra Part III.B.
26.
See Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 865.
27.
See Dodd–Frank Act § 951(c).
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regulation of compensation practices, those courts risk further federal intrusion in
this area. Such intrusion could have negative implications because federal
regulation too often leads to one-size-fits-all solutions while hindering corporate
innovation and experimentation.28 Third, say on pay votes are likely an ideal
vehicle for increasing state courts’ role not only because courts should encourage
boards to consider shareholder concerns but also because negative say on pay
votes may be a critical signal that there is a defect in pay policies that needs to be
addressed. For these reasons, courts should take the opportunity to use say on pay
as a springboard for developing a more in-depth assessment of board decisionmaking related to compensation matters.
Part I of this Article examines executive compensation trends before and
after the financial crisis and explains how most commentators have concluded that
compensation is excessive.29 Part I ends by revealing that most commentators
agree that the best way to address excessive executive compensation is to enhance
accountability. Part II discusses the rise of say on pay as an ideal accountability
measure, as well as the debate regarding the merits of say on pay. Part III reveals
why most commentators believe fiduciary duty law is neither necessary nor
appropriate as an accountability tool. Part III also explores the potential viability of
the shareholder derivative actions brought in the wake of say on pay votes in the
context of current Delaware law. 30 Moreover, Part III reveals how most courts
have chosen to dismiss say on pay suits. Part IV demonstrates why the efforts to
dismiss the importance of fiduciary duty law as an accountability check for
compensation decisions may be premature and makes the affirmative case not only
for altering the manner in which Delaware courts assess such suits, but also for
using say on pay suits as a platform for such alteration.

I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Executive Compensation Trends
Studies confirm that executive pay at large U.S. companies has sharply
risen over the past few decades. Most studies define executive pay to include base
salaries and bonuses or incentive-based compensation, including cash, stock, stock

28.
See infra Part IV.B.5.
29.
Despite some debate on the topic, this Article accepts the premise that
executive compensation is excessive at some corporations and needs to be curtailed. Even
defenders of executive pay acknowledge that some practices can be problematic. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615,
1661–62 (2005). This Article also acknowledges the difficulties of determining when
compensation should be deemed excessive, which is why this Article focuses on reforms
that rely on the corporation’s own metrics and policies as a guide for such a determination.
30.
Part III and this Article as a whole focus on Delaware due to its
acknowledged prominence in corporate law. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457 (2004). According to the Delaware Division of Corporations,
Delaware is the incorporation home to more than 50% of U.S. public companies and 63% of
Fortune 500 companies. Delaware Division of Corporations, DELAWARE.GOV,
http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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options, or other arrangements.31 One study revealed that the average annual CEO
pay at S&P 500 companies increased from $850,000 in 1970 to more than $14
million in 2000—an increase driven largely by the practice of awarding stock
options and restricted stock.32 During the 1980s, CEO compensation grew by
212%,33 and from 1980 to 1995, average CEO pay increased by 380%. 34 From
1993 to 2003, median CEO compensation at S&P 500 firms increased 146%. 35
During that same period, the median pay of the five most highly compensated
executives at S&P 500 companies increased by 125%.36 Median CEO pay
increased by 25% in 2004,37 and another 25% in 2005.38 These studies confirm that
executive compensation in general, and CEO compensation in particular, has
grown considerably in the past few decades.
CEO compensation dipped during the financial crisis but appears to have
rebounded.39 In 2007, median CEO pay at S&P 500 companies was about $9
million.40 In 2008, median pay fell for the first time since 2002, dropping 6.8% to
approximately $8.4 million.41 Such a drop stemmed from the fact that in 2008
median bonuses and incentive cash payments fell 27%, though base salaries rose
by 3%.42 Median CEO pay fell again in 2009 by 7.9% to $7.5 million. 43 In 2010,

31.
See Barris, supra note 18, at 63–64; Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The
Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 284 (2005); Hansen &
Strauss, supra note 15.
32.
Jensen et al., supra note 1, at 24–25; see also Barris, supra note 18, at 64
(revealing that stock options represent the fastest growing component of compensation
packages). Studies also suggest that executive compensation increased due to an increased
frequency of filling CEO vacancies externally, as opposed to locating new CEOs inside the
firm. See Jensen et al., supra note 1, at 32–34.
33.
Barris, supra note 18, at 60.
34.
Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
35.
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 31, at 285.
36.
Id.
37.
Hansen & Strauss, supra note 15.
38.
Id.
39.
See generally Mira Ganor, Agency Costs in the Era of Economic Crisis: The
Enhanced Connection Between CEO Compensation and Corporate Cash Holdings, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 105 (2013).
40.
Press Release, Equilar, Inc., CEO Pay Drops 4.0% to $2.7 Million. Bonuses
Fall 22.6% (Apr. 7, 2009) [hereinafter CEO Pay Drops], available at http://www.equilar.
com/company/press-release/press-release-2009/ceo-pay-falls-6.8-in-first-drop-since-2002bonuses-cut-by-20.6.html (noting that median CEO salaries in 2007 were $9,061,057).
41.
Id.
42.
See Del Jones & Barbara Hansen, CEO Pay Packages Sink with the
Economy, USA TODAY, May 4, 2009, at 1B; see also CEO Pay Drops, supra note 40
(noting a 20.6% drop in median bonuses and a 5.7% rise in median base salary at S&P firms
from 2007 to 2008). The SEC requires corporations to value stocks options as if they were
exercised on the grant date, which could inflate or deflate CEO’s compensation. See Jones
& Hansen, supra. In 2008, it was estimated that 90% of CEO options were under water,
meaning that their “current stock price [was] too low to yield a profit.” Id. Hence, the actual
value of CEO compensation, incorporating such options, was considerably lower. Of
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CEO compensation returned to its 2007 levels with median CEO pay totaling
about $9 million, a 27% jump from 2009.44
In addition to the tremendous growth in CEO compensation, the gap
between CEO wages and those of the average worker45 has grown considerably
over the decades. In 1960, the average CEO made 40 times as much as the average
worker.46 In 1991, CEOs received 140 times the average worker’s pay.47 In 2001,
this ratio peaked at 525 to 1.48 In 2003, the ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay
fell to 301 to 1 and then rose to 431 to 1 in 2004.49 Currently, empirical data
reflects a ratio of anywhere from 400 to 1 to about 300 to 1.50

course, restricted stock and options were issued in 2009 at low strike prices. See id.
Therefore, such grants may be considerably more valuable once stock prices rise. See id.
Moreover, many companies either reprice or reissue options if they become valueless. See
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 165; Davis, supra note 5, at 431–32.
43.
Press Release, Equilar, Inc., Bucking Trend, S&P 400 CEO Compensation
Rises in Equilar Pay Study (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.equilar.com/company/
press-release/press-release-2010/overall-ceo-compensation-falls-bonuses-surge-in-sp-500pay-study.html.
44.
Matt Krantz & Barbara Hansen, CEO Pay Soars While Workers’ Pay Stalls,
USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2011, at 1B. But see Daniel Costello, The Drought is Over (at Least
for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at BU1 (noting that median CEO pay rose to $9.6
million, a 12% jump from 2009). In 2010, the highest paid CEO made about $84 million.
See id.; Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay in 2010 Jumped 11%, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2011, at B1.
45.
For an example of one editorial that seeks to describe “average worker,” see
Charles Kolb, The Value(s) of Wall Street, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2010, 2:07 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-kolb/the-values-of-wall-street_b_652697.html.
46.
Ron Ashkenas, Rethinking the Assumptions Behind Executive Pay, HARV.
BUS. REV. (June 22, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/ashkenas/2010/06/rethinkingthe-assumptions-beh.html.
47.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 130–31.
48.
Jeanne Sahadi, CEO Pay: Sky High Gets Even Higher, CNNMONEY (Aug.
30, 2005, 12:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/26/news/economy/ceo_pay/.
49.
Id.
50.
See Delman, supra note 6, at 598–99 (noting that the ratio of CEO pay to the
average worker’s pay was more than 300 to 1 in 2008); Michael B. Dorff, The Group
Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2007)
(noting that the ratio of a CEO’s pay to the average worker’s pay went from approximately
40 to 1 to more than 400 to 1 by 2007); Loewenstein, supra note 34, at 6 (noting that from
1980 to 1995, average CEO pay increased 380% even though workers’ salaries only
increased by 60%); Jennifer Hicks, Does CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio Matter?, SMARTBLOG
ON LEADERSHIP (June 1, 2011), http://smartblogs.com/leadership/2011/06/01/does-ceo-toworker-pay-ratio-matter/ (noting that CEOs made 336 times the pay of an average worker in
2010); Albert R. Hunt, Letter from Washington: As U.S. Rich-Poor Gap Grows, So Does
Public Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/world/
americas/18iht-letter.4637416.html?pagewanted=all (noting that CEO pay is 400 times that
of the average worker’s pay).
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B. Executive Compensation as Excess
Public opinion surveys consistently report that the vast majority of
Americans believe executives at publicly held corporations are overpaid.51 At least
one survey reveals that about 90% of institutional investors view executives’ pay
as excessive.52 Those who characterize executive compensation as excessive
generally do so for one of the three reasons discussed below.
1. The Pay-for-Performance Disconnect
The most prevalent reason why shareholders and the public view
executive compensation as excessive is that they believe that such compensation is
not sufficiently linked to corporate performance. Hence, such groups express
outrage when executives receive large pay packages while their companies’ stock
price or annual shareholder return is flat or deteriorating. 53
Whatever the causes, the pay-for-performance disconnect appears to be
the primary driver of discontent over executive compensation. In the context of say
on pay, recent data reveals that proxy advisory firms54—which are entities that
issue recommendations regarding how shareholders should vote—are most likely
to recommend rejecting corporations’ pay practices when there is a perceived payfor-performance disconnect.55 Similarly, the primary reason shareholders give for
51.
See, e.g., Press Release, Humphrey Taylor, Chairman, Harris Interactive,
Polls Find Strong Populist Mood in Europe and to a Lesser Extent in the USA 3 tbl.4 (July
25, 2007), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-PollResearch-FT-Globalization-2007-07.pdf (revealing that 77% of Americans believe that
executives are over paid); RBJ Snap Poll: CEOs of Public Companies Are Overpaid,
ROCHESTER BUS. J. (May 27, 2011), http://www.rbj.net/print_article.asp?aID=187715
(noting that 86% respondents to an RBJ Daily Report Snap Poll said CEOs of U.S.
companies are given too much money).
52.
Press Release, Towers Watson, Institutional Investors Dissatisfied with U.S.
Executive Pay System, Watson Wyatt Study Finds (Dec. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/render.asp?catid=1&id=15518.
53.
See THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 5, at 7, 9 (noting that public anger over
executive compensation relates to the overall increase in pay but also to pay arrangements
that appear unrelated to performance). In their seminal book, Pay Without Performance,
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried illustrate the widespread pay-for-performance disconnect
at public companies and advance theories for its root causes, as well as potential solutions.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18.
54.
See LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 60–61 (2011).
55.
See COGENT COMP. PARTNERS, SAY-ON-PAY UPDATE: VOTING RESULTS AND
TRENDS SO FAR 4–5 (June 1, 2011), available at http://www.cogentcompensation.com/
images/resources/SayOnPayUpdate_June2011.pdf; MICHAEL R. LITTENBERG ET AL.,
SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, THE VOTES ARE IN—DECONSTRUCTING THE 2011 SAY ON PAY
VOTE 2 (2011), available at http://www.srz.com/files/News/dbf0ba31-2627-402c-b2113a6cc3e83295/Presentation/NewsAttachment/643250b0-a583-444c-9011-05277889fc1e/06
2811_The_Votes_Are_In_Deconstructing_the_2011_Say_on_Pay_Vote.pdf (revealing that
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) pinpointed a pay-for-performance disconnect at
31 of the 36 companies whose pay packages were rejected by shareholders).
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rejecting a company’s pay package relates to pay-for-performance issues.56 For
example, shareholders rejected the pay arrangements at a company in which the
CEO received a $6.7 million increase in pay while the company’s one-year
shareholder return was negative 10.3% and its three-year return was negative
30.6%.57 Then too, in each of the lawsuits filed after a negative say on pay vote,
shareholders claimed that there was a disconnect between executive pay and
company performance.58
During the financial crisis, the disconnect between pay and performance
drove compensation issues into the spotlight. For instance, public anger
skyrocketed upon learning of the decision by American International Group
(“AIG”) to pay its executives bonuses totaling $165 million on the heels of
receiving more than $170 billion in bailout funds from the federal government. 59
Such outrage prompted Congress to pass laws prohibiting companies, which
receive financial assistance, from awarding incentive pay, applying a 90% tax to
AIG and other firms that accepted large sums of federal bailout funds, 60 and
ultimately imposing laws prohibiting TARP companies from paying bonuses.61
Similar outrage followed news that the head of Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc.
(“Lehman Brothers”), made some $480 million in the years preceding the bank’s
historic collapse in 2008.62 The public’s fury was ignited again upon learning that
Merrill Lynch & Company, Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”), paid $3.6 billion in bonuses
after losing about $27 billion and receiving $10 billion in TARP funding.63 Indeed,
the New York Attorney General issued a report revealing that nine banks issued
$32.6 billion in bonuses in 2008 while receiving $175 billion of funding from the
56.
TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON
REPORT 5 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/private/
2011_US_PostSeason_Report_0929.pdf.
57.
Id. at 7.
58.
See William Alan Nelson II, Ending the Silence: Shareholder Derivative
Suits and Amending the Dodd–Frank Act so “Say on Pay” Votes May be Heard in the
Boardroom, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 149, 172–74 (2012); infra Part II.C (discussing
suits).
59.
See Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses
After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1; see also Helene Cooper,
Obama Orders Treasury Chief to Try to Block A.I.G. Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/politics/17obama.html?fta=y; Jonathan Weisman et
al., Political Heat Sears AIG, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at A1.
60.
See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House Approves 90% Tax on
Bonuses After Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A1.
61.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D) (2012)) (requiring TARP companies to
prohibit the payment of bonuses).
62.
Jim Puzzanghera, Lehman Chief Grilled on Pay, Leadership of Company,
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/10/07/
lehman_chief_grilled_on_pay_leadership_of_company/.
63.
See ANDREW CUOMO, NO RHYME OR REASON: THE ‘HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU
LOSE’ BANKS BONUS CULTURE 10 (July 30, 2009), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/
default/files/press-releases/archived/Bonus%20Report%20Final%207.30.09.pdf; Michael J.
de la Merced & Louise Story, Nearly 700 at Merrill in Million-Dollar Club, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2009, at B1.
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government.64 The report fueled sentiments of outrage, as well as congressional
reform efforts.65
2. Parachutes as Good as Gold
The second concern regarding executive compensation relates to
executives who receive exit packages after overseeing a corporation whose
performance has declined. 66 These exit packages, known as “golden parachutes,”
mushroomed during the takeover movements in the 1980s.67 During that period,
executives began contracting for exit packages that would compensate them in the
event of being fired after a takeover or some other change of control. 68 Golden
parachutes can be viewed as an anti-takeover device because their existence made
it more costly to terminate incumbent executives, thereby either increasing the cost
of a potential takeover or ensuring that executives would remain in the office posttakeover.69 Since the 1980s, golden parachutes have become a fixture of executive
pay packages.70

64.
See CUOMO supra note 63, at 5–6.
65.
See Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During
Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A1; Karen Freifeld, Banks Paid $32.6 Billion in
Bonuses Amid U.S. Bailout (Update4), BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2009, 5:38 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHURVoSUqpho.
66.
See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 368, 374 (2009); Josh Fineman, Nardelli Exit Package Called ‘Outrage,” May
Heighten Pay Debate, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2007, 4:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aI7fAyAMAi2A. Shareholders also have expressed
concern about so-called “golden coffins”—benefits paid upon the death of an executive that
significantly exceed life insurance or other payments typically made to employees. See THE
CONFERENCE BD., supra note 5, at 22. In 2009, there was significant shareholder support for
shareholder proposals seeking to curb golden coffin benefits. Subodh Mishra, Governance
Proposals: Support for Reform Grows, in RISKMETRICS GROUP POSTSEASON REPORT 2009:
A NEW VOICE IN GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL POLICYMAKERS SHAPE THE ROAD TO REFORM 13,
13–14 (Oct. 2009), available at https://www.governanceexchange.com/repository/
KnowledgeGateway/pubs/2009_PSR_Client_final.PDF.
67.
Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 955, 955–58 (1987).
68.
See id. at 955–60; see also Cherry & Wong, supra note 66, at 374.
69.
See Robert A. Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can
Federal Law Be Mobilized to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337,
341 (1983); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1218 n.63
(1984). But see Bress, supra note 67, at 955–62 (noting that golden parachutes may be
beneficial to companies prone to engage in takeover activity because they may reduce the
risks associated with takeovers and help align executives’ incentives with those of
shareholders).
70.
Jensen et al., supra note 1, at 28–29. In 2000, 70% of the largest 1,000
companies had change-in-control agreements, as opposed to 41% in 1988. Id. at 29. Such
agreements typically incorporate golden parachutes. See Hansen & Strauss, supra note 15
(noting that golden parachute payments have become “boilerplate”).
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One of the most notable cases involved the CEO of The Walt Disney
Company (“Disney”), who received a $140 million severance package after
working at the company just over 14 months. 71 The pay package ignited
shareholder outrage, spurring several lawsuits, as well as several shareholder
campaigns aimed at gaining more influence over directors and their pay
decisions.72 Golden parachute arrangements also have drawn shareholders’ ire
during the financial crisis. Shareholders fumed when Home Depot’s CEO received
a $210 million severance package after overseeing a company whose stock price
had fallen by 12% during his five-year tenure while the stock price at the
company’s biggest competitor had increased by 173%.73 Shareholders also
expressed outrage when Merrill Lynch’s CEO received some $161 million as exit
pay a week after the company reported a $7.9 billion write-down from subprime
mortgage losses—the largest loss in the corporation’s history.74 Similarly, the CEO
of Citigroup, Inc. (“Citigroup”), received about $68 million upon his departure,
including a car and driver “for the lesser of five years or until he commences full
time employment with another employer” after presiding over a company whose
losses resulted in $7.2 billion dollars of write-downs.75 Similar to executive
compensation, shareholders express concern about golden parachutes primarily
when there appears to be no link between them and corporate performance. 76
3. Pay Inequity
Some shareholders insist that executive pay should be more closely
aligned with the pay of average workers. Additionally, some investors share the
71.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998).
72.
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Walt Disney Co., 731 A.2d at
353. Shareholder outrage led to a “withhold the vote” campaign against Disney’s CEO and
board chair, resulting in 45% of the shareholder votes being withheld—at the time, one of
the largest withholdings in history. Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for
Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 62 (2008).
73.
Fineman, supra note 66; Joe Nocera, The Board Wore Chicken Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2006, at C1.
74.
Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Merrill CEO Steps Down, Leaves Firm in Crisis,
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2007, at D01. Interestingly, the board did not give the CEO severance
pay. Id. Instead, his exit package primarily included unexercised stock options and stock
awards. Id. The lack of severance pay prompted some to mute their criticism of the pay
package. Id.
75.
See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114, 138
(Del. Ch. 2009). Such pay led to a shareholder lawsuit. Id. Shareholders also brought suit
alleging that that directors should be held liable for failing to monitor the risk the company
faced resulting from investment in subprime mortgages, as well as for failing to properly
disclose the company’s exposure to such risk. Id. at 126, 131–32.
76.
See Del Jones & Edward Iwata, Top Executives’ Pay Takes a Hit, USA
TODAY, Sept. 29, 2008, at 4B (discussing exit pay by some firms during the crisis and
noting that golden parachutes have long been a “sore point” with investors). In the U.K.,
shareholders view generous golden parachutes as particularly egregious because they are
deemed to be “rewards for failure.” See Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes
and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527, 527 (2013).
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sentiment that CEO pay should be no more than 100 times that of the average
worker.77 From this perspective, the increasing gap between executive pay and that
of the average worker makes executive compensation excessive. 78 During the
crisis, this gap was amplified when CEO salaries increased while the
unemployment rate steadily rose and average worker pay increased only slightly. 79
C. Debating the Excess
There are some commentators who insist that most executive pay should
not be characterized as excessive. 80 First, even though headlines are replete with
stories about executives receiving lavish pay packages despite their companies’
lackluster performance, these headlines may distort the actual compensation
picture. For example, some CEOs agreed to forego salaries and bonuses during the
height of the crisis.81 Also, some studies indicate that CEO pay fell as profits fell
during the crisis and that CEO pay has recently recovered as profits and stock
prices have begun their recovery. 82 This suggests that executive pay, in some
cases, is in sync with corporate performance.
Second, it is arguable that so long as the market dictates pay practices, it
is inappropriate to characterize compensation as excessive. 83 The board’s primary
responsibility is to hire a top-performing CEO.84 Because executives are in short
77.
Hicks, supra note 50, at 2 (discussing a survey where approximately 51% of
respondents indicated that CEO salaries should be no more than 100 times that of the
average worker).
78.
See Delman, supra note 6, at 599 (noting that some shareholders and
Americans view this disparity as a social injustice).
79.
See Costello, supra note 44; Krantz & Hansen, supra note 44 (noting that
CEO pay increased 27% in 2010 while average worker pay only increased by 2.1%).
80.
Loewenstein, supra note 34, at 3–4.
81.
Jones & Hansen, supra note 42. Seventy-nine CEOs received no bonuses and
six CEOs either took no salary or a $1 salary in 2008. Id.
82.
See Kantz & Hansen, supra note 44; EQUILAR, INC., 2009 PROXY SEASON
TRENDS 6–7 (Apr. 23, 2009) (demonstrating that CEO pay decreased at poorly performing
firms and that bonus payments fell by 65.2% at the worst performing firms), available at
http://www.naspp.com/ChapterEventFiles/e2902_Equilar_Proxy_Season_Trends_for_MN_
NASPP_on_04_23_2009.pdf.
83.
See Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other?: Testing the
Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J.
CORP. L. 255, 267 (2005) (noting the theory that when executive compensation is set by an
efficient market, it is difficult to describe such compensation as excessive); Loewenstein,
supra note 34, at 2 (pointing out the theory that free market controls compensation and thus
executives cannot be considered overpaid); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate
Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 975–78 (1980) (noting that market forces dictate executive
compensation).
84.
AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S
GUIDEBOOK § 4 (6th ed. 2011) (noting that a director’s principal responsibility is to hire top
management, which includes establishing and evaluating their compensation); Simmons,
supra note 1, at 310; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2010, at 7
(Apr. 2010), available at http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads
/2010_Principles_of_Corporate_Governance_1.pdf (“Making decisions regarding the
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supply, and demand for executives is high, companies must expend significant
resources to hire and retain them. 85 Moreover, the difference in pay reflects
differences in levels of contribution because executives not only may contribute
more than other workers, but also, may have a greater impact on corporate
performance.86 This is why it may be inappropriate to measure executive
compensation against that of average worker pay or to otherwise use the ratio to
characterize executive pay as too lavish.
Third, although many agree that pay must be aligned with performance, it
is not clear how best to achieve such a result.87 Indeed, outrage over executive
compensation may reflect an inadequate understanding of executive compensation
policies and practices. On the one hand, corporations rely on a variety of different
metrics to set pay.88 Hence, it may be unfair to critique executive pay based on
only one metric—its relationship with overall corporate performance. On the other
hand, compensation experts cannot necessarily predict the impact of pay practices.
Some practices produce unintended consequences. As one scholar points out, there
used to be “little doubt” among the most influential corporate-law scholars that
emphasizing stock-based pay would align managers’ incentives with shareholders’
interests.89 Yet this presumption has been proven false. Such pay not only has
spurred rises in compensation packages, but has also created misalignment
between executive pay and performance. 90 In light of the complexity associated
with executive compensation decisions, defenders of the current system argue that
selection, compensation and evaluation of a well-qualified and ethical CEO is the single
most important function of the board.”).
85.
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 31, at 298; see Jensen et al., supra note 1,
at 32–34 (noting that CEO compensation increased when corporations began hiring CEOs
from outside of their company instead of from within their internal candidate pool).
86.
See Pak, supra note 4, at 638–39 (pinpointing the argument that the
difference between executive and worker pay reflects executives’ greater contribution to
corporate success).
87.
See Dorff, supra note 83, at 267 (noting that the question of what constitutes
excessive compensation is “almost impossible to answer”); Loewenstein, supra note 1, at
206–07 (pinpointing a complex set of questions that must be addressed when seeking to set
executive compensation at an appropriate level); Loewenstein, supra note 34, at 5 (noting
that the supply and demand for workers may have reduced their bargaining power to
demand higher wages); Pak, supra note 4, at 641 (“[C]orrelating pay to performance may be
a herculean task which defies easy comprehension and quick solutions.”).
88.
Simmons, supra note 1, at 310–12.
89.
Cunningham, supra note 18, at 1190.
90.
See id. at 1195–97. Professor Cunningham points out that when corporations
compensate boards with stock-based pay, managers’ incentives may become misaligned
with shareholders in at least three ways: (1) managers become fixated on current stock price
in a manner that undermines a focus on long-term value; (2) such fixation causes managers
to be tempted to distort financial records and financial performance; and (3) managers
prefer stock repurchases to cash dividends, even when such repurchases are less beneficial
to most shareholders. Id. at 1195–96. In short, a focus on stock-based compensation for
boards has the unintended consequence of causing boards to focus on issues at odds with
shareholders in an effort to buttress stock performance, and thus, boards’ overall
compensation.
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so long as boards make reasonable efforts to align profits with performance, the
ultimate pay award should not be viewed as excessive.
Critics nevertheless insist that the current executive-compensation system
is flawed. In particular, several commentators have advanced a managerial-power
theory demonstrating and undermining the view that pay arrangements result from
an arms-length, market-based bargaining system.91 Instead, the theory indicates
that too often compensation reflects dominance by the CEO or other influences
that distort pay arrangements.92 In other words, boards are captured by
management and make decisions that benefit executives at shareholders’
expense.93 At least some evidence supports this board-capture theory, revealing a
significant divide between pay and performance. 94 Thus, anecdotal evidence and
studies demonstrate that during the financial crisis executive pay remained the
same at many companies even as their profits or revenues fell. 95 Other studies
show that bonuses and overall compensation at some firms did not vary
significantly even as profits diminished.96 But others indicate that pay and bonuses
at many other companies rose sharply even though shareholder returns and profits
decreased.97
Ultimately, as Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann note, after the
financial crisis, the notion that that our current pay system is problematic mostly
because of a pay-for-performance disconnect has become “widely accepted.”98 As
this next Section pinpoints, there is also general agreement that accountability may
be the cure to this misalignment.
D. Accountability as Cure for the Excess
Directors have a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that CEO and
executive pay is set at an appropriate level. Some even consider decisions related
to the selection and compensation of the CEO and senior executives to be the

91.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 64–66; Andrew Bethune, An
Efficient “Say” on Executive Pay: Shareholder Opt-In As a Solution to the Managerial
Power Problem, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 585, 595–98 (2011); Dorff, supra note 83, at 267–68;
Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 866–
67 (2008).
92.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 61–62.
93.
See id.
94.
See Barris, supra note 18, at 65; Dorff, supra note 83, at 268–69.
95.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257–62
(2010); Janice McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal
Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-Up Call for Reforming Executive
Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 131, 138–39 (2009); see also Story & Dash, supra note
65.
96.
See CUOMO, supra note 63, at 1.
97.
See EQUILAR, INC., supra note 82, at 6.
98.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98
GEO. L.J. 247, 249–50 (2010) (noting that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the view
that there are flaws in the compensation arrangements has become “widely accepted”).

2013]

SUE ON PAY

17

board’s primary function.99 Public company boards delegate this function to the
compensation committee, though all directors are ultimately responsible for
executive pay decisions.
In light of this responsibility, if executive compensation is excessive, then
boards have failed in their fiduciary obligations. Hence, executive pay critics
consistently assert that boards have done an inadequate job not only with respect to
devising compensation packages, but also in relation to developing appropriate
executive pay policies and practices.100
The most dominant rationale for this inadequacy is the board-capture
theory. Pursuant to this theory, managers have considerable influence over boards
in part because managers play a significant role in the director nomination
process.101 Because boards feel beholden to CEOs and other senior executives,
they fail to provide any meaningful check on executive compensation packages. 102
Instead, executives dictate the terms of those packages. 103 Moreover, directors are
too often at an informational disadvantage when assessing and approving
compensation packages.104 As a result, they defer to executives or other
corporation managers who may have more expertise and experience. 105 The boardcapture theory posits that executive pay arrangements are not the result of an armslength bargaining process but instead tend to benefit executives at the expense of
the corporation and its shareholders.
The antidote to board capture is to enhance board accountability, ensuring
that boards are properly incentivized to focus on the interest of the corporation and
its shareholders when crafting pay policies. 106 As the SEC noted, the financial
99.
BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 84 (“Making decisions regarding the
selection, compensation and evaluation of a well-qualified and ethical CEO is the single
most important function of the board.”); AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS,
supra note 84 (noting that a director’s principal responsibility is to hire top management,
which includes establishing and evaluating their compensation).
100.
See THE CONFERENCE BD., supra note 5, at 9; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note
18, at 61.
101.
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 80; Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at
852–53.
102.
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 80; Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at
852–53.
103.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 80; Thomas & Wells, supra note
18, at 852–53.
104.
See Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 851.
105.
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 80; see also Thomas & Wells, supra
note 18, at 852–54.
106.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview
of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 672–73 (2005); CEO Compensation in the Post-Enron
Era: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., S. Hrg. 108-893, 108th
Cong. (2003) (statement of Damon A. Silvers, Associate General Counsel of the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) (“[W]e believe that solutions
to the problem of executive pay require at minimum good disclosure to investors and the
public and real accountability of boards . . . .”), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-108shrg97981/html/CHRG-108shrg97981.htm.
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crisis caused many to question whether boards of directors are truly held
responsible for the decisions that they make, including “whether boards need to be
more accountable for their decisions regarding such issues as compensation
structures . . . .”107
Reforms therefore seek to enhance board accountability by reducing
boards’ dependency on managers and increasing the extent to which they feel
compelled to pay heed to the concerns of shareholders, concerns of the public, and
the interests of the corporation more generally. 108 In its report on responses to the
financial crisis, one group of governance experts emphasized that “[g]reater board
accountability to shareholders is essential to improve executive compensation
practices.”109 Indeed, reformers believe that increased disclosure surrounding
executive compensation will make directors more accountable for those decisions
by increasing shareholder and public awareness of the nature of their decisions and
potential problems related thereto.110 The compensation reforms under Dodd–
Frank also seek to enhance board accountability. Reflecting this aim, the
compensation reforms in Dodd–Frank appear under the heading “Accountability
and Executive Compensation.”111
Although fiduciary duty law is the primary accountability mechanism
under state law, most reforms ignore or actively shun such law. Instead, reforms
have focused on other measures, including, most recently, say on pay. Part II
discusses say on pay and its potential to enhance accountability, while Part III
reveals why fiduciary law has been shunned in favor of say on pay.

II. SAY ON PAY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Say on Pay Has Its Day
During the financial crisis, many different reforms emerged to enhance
board accountability related to executive compensation. Those reforms ranged
from outright restrictions on pay packages to enhanced disclosure related to
107.
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Chairman: Statement at SEC Open Meeting on Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch0520
09mls.htm.
108.
See Simmons, supra note 1, at 335–37 (noting perception that most believe
executive compensation reform should focus on subjecting compensation decisions to
greater accountability).
109.
SEE IRA MILLSTEIN ET AL., MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE &
PERFORMANCE, AGENDA FOR PRIVATE SECTOR REFORM: OMNIBUS POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A POST-CRISIS MARKET 14 (2009), available at http://millstein.som.
yale.edu/sites/millstein.som.yale.edu/files/Policy%20Briefing%20No%206-Omnibus.pdf.
110.
Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 2006, at BU1 (quoting former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox as saying, “when people
are forced to undress in public, they’ll pay more attention to their figures”).
111.
Dodd–Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, subtit. E, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–
1908 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2012) and scattered sections under title 15 of the
U.S. Code).
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executive compensation.112 The federal government even appointed a so-called pay
czar to oversee and approve the executive pay arrangements at certain companies
receiving TARP funds.113
Amidst these reforms, say on pay has garnered considerable attention and
support. As one commentator noted, say on pay emerged from “a novel idea at the
margins of the executive pay debate to center stage as the leading hope for
ensuring that shareholders have a voice in the compensation-setting process.”114
Increasingly, shareholders have expressed support for say on pay. 115 In response,

112.
See Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation & the
Obama Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491, 529–51 (2010) (describing and critiquing various reforms).
Reforms aimed at curbing executive compensation run the gamut. Some reforms, called
clawbacks, require executives to return bonuses or other incentive-based compensation if it
is later determined that the corporation must restate its earnings or if bonuses or similar
compensation were awarded during a period in which it is determined that the corporation
has engaged in fraud. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 347. Other reforms also have focused
on ways to limit executive compensation. For example, TARP guidelines have restricted
compensation for performance to one-third of an executive’s securities compensation
package. See Executive Compensation: Plan, Preform & Pay, DELOITTE, http://www.
deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/additional-services/chief-financial-officer/6297c38dfe
289210VgnVCM200000bb42f00aRCRD.htm (last updated July 14, 2010). The Obama
administration also cut executive salaries of certain companies receiving government
bailouts by about 50%. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. Will Order Pay Cuts at Firms with
Bailout Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at A1. Dodd–Frank has various executive
compensation disclosure requirements including a provision requiring companies to disclose
the median annual total compensation of all their employees, excluding the CEO; the annual
total compensation of the CEO; and the ratio between the two. Dodd–Frank § 953(b). In
June 2011, the House Financial Services Committee passed an act seeking to repeal Section
953(b) and to make any regulations issued pursuant to it have no force or effect. Cydney
Posner, Bill to Repeal Required Dodd–Frank Disclosure Regarding Internal Pay Equity,
COOLEY, LLP (June 24, 2011), http://www.cooley.com/65216. Disclosure on executive
compensation dates back to at least 1992 when the SEC responded to concerns regarding
heightened executive pay by passing disclosure rules requiring companies to disclose the
compensation of top executives in the proxy statement. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 342–
43.
113.
Deborah Solomon, White House Set to Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J.,
June 5, 2009, at A2. The administration appointed Kenneth Feinberg to be the special
master for compensation. Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives’ Pay at 7 Ailing
Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A1.
114.
COMPENSIA, INC., supra note 8, at 6.
115.
Say on pay initially emerged through the shareholder proposal process,
pursuant to which shareholders submit proposals on the corporation’s proxy statement to be
voted on by other shareholders. The first say on pay proposals appeared in 2006. See
Reeder, supra note 10, at 139; Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial:
International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 1, 11 (2008); Allan Sloan, Aflac Looks Smart on Pay, WASH. POST, May 29,
2007, at D01 (noting that such proposals were sponsored by the American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees). In 2007, shareholders submitted over 60 say on pay
proposals, averaging 40% shareholder support. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note
12. By 2009, shareholders submitted more than 100 such proposals, making it the most
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some corporations voluntarily adopted it.116 Although there was some support for
say on pay at the federal level,117 that support increased dramatically during the
financial crisis. Thus, in 2009, federal legislation required companies receiving
TARP funds to hold an annual say on pay vote until the funds were repaid. 118 As a
result, more than 300 companies were required to hold say on pay votes.119
In 2010, Dodd–Frank made say on pay a permanent feature of the
corporate governance landscape.120 Under Dodd–Frank, public companies must
provide an advisory vote on the compensation of the five most highly compensated
executives.121 This includes the CEO, CFO, and the next three most highly
compensated executives. Companies must provide a say on pay vote at least once
every three years.122 However, Dodd–Frank gives shareholders a voice in
determining the frequency of the say on pay vote. Thus, companies must conduct a

dominant shareholder proposal of the year. See Reeder, supra note 10, at 2; see also
RiskMetrics Grp., 2009 Proxy Season Scorecard, RISKMETRICS GRP. (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://www.shareholderforum.com/sop/Library/20091215_RiskMetrics-Scorecard.pdf
(reflecting that say on pay was the most prevalent shareholder proposal submitted in 2009).
In 2009, the average shareholder support for shareholder-sponsored say on pay proposals
had risen to about 41%, with almost three times as many proposals receiving majority
support as compared to 2008. See Randall Thomas et al., Dodd–Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It
Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1213, 1242 (2012).
116.
In response to a 2006 shareholder proposal, Aflac was the first company to
make such an announcement, and in 2008, Aflac became the first company to hold a say on
pay vote. See Sloan, supra note 115; see also Press Release, Aflac, Aflac Moves Up ‘Sayon-Pay’ Shareholder Vote to 2008, available at http://www.aflac.com/aboutaflac/
pressroom/pressreleasestory.aspx?rid=1078006 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013); Press Release,
Cheryl Kelly, AFSCME, More than 50 Companies Voluntarily Adopt “Say on Pay” as
Institutional Investors Continue to Press for an Advisory Vote (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.waldenassetmgmt.com/social/action/SOP_3-2-10.pdf. By early 2010, more than
50 companies had announced an intention to provide say on pay, including Apple,
Blockbuster, and Motorola. See id.
117.
In 2007, the House passed a say on pay bill. See Shareholder Vote on
Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1257rfs/pdf/BILLS-110hr1257rfs.pdf. ThenSenator Barack Obama sponsored the companion say on pay bill in the Senate, but it failed
to muster the necessary votes. See Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S.
1181, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s1181. In
2009, members of both the House and Senate proposed say on pay provisions in bills aimed
at responding to the financial crisis. See Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, H.R.
2861, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?
bill=h111-2861; Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009),
available
at
http://law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/legislation/bill-textshareholders-bill-of-rights-act-of-2009.pdf.
118.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2012).
119.
See Reeder, supra note 10; Weaver et al., supra note 10, at 24.
120.
Dodd–Frank Act § 951.
121.
Id. § 951(a)(1).
122.
Id.
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nonbinding “say on frequency” vote at least once every six years.123 Pursuant to
the vote, shareholders can recommend whether to have a say on pay vote annually,
every two years, or every three years.124 These say on pay rules took effect on
January 21, 2011, for all large public companies but were delayed by two years for
smaller companies.125
In certain circumstances, Dodd–Frank also requires companies to hold a
say on pay vote for golden parachute arrangements in connection with mergers,
acquisitions, consolidations, or sale of all, or substantially all, of the company’s
assets.126 When shareholder approval is required for such transactions, companies
must also seek a separate say on pay vote related to golden parachute arrangements
between the target company and executives, unless the golden parachute
arrangements were included in disclosures comprising a company’s prior say on
pay vote.127 These golden parachute provisions took effect for proxy statements
filed on or after April 25, 2011.128 These say on pay votes on overall compensation
and golden parachutes respond to two of the primary shareholder concerns
animating the executive pay debate.
B. Say on Pay as Accountability Cure
Although there is considerable debate about the merits of say on pay,
advocates support say on pay as a critical mechanism for enhancing director
accountability.129 Based primarily on the U.K. experience, advocates insist that say
on pay enhances such accountability and thus better aligns executive pay with
corporate performance.130 The most comprehensive study of the impact of say on
pay in the U.K. reveals that say on pay has more closely linked pay and
performance, particularly at poorly performing firms. 131 Supporters point to this
data as evidence of the positive impact say on pay can have on American

123.
Id. § 951(a)(2).
124.
Id.
125.
Dodd–Frank characterizes small companies, and thus companies with
delayed implementation of the say on pay rules, as companies with a public float of less
than $75 million. See Christopher G. Barrett & William K. Hadler, Final Say-on-Pay Rules
Delay Requirements for Smaller Reporting Companies and TARP Recipients, NAT’L L. REV.
(Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.natlawreview.com/article/final-say-pay-rulesdelay-requirements-smaller-reporting-companies-and-tarp-participants.
126.
Dodd–Frank Act § 951(b).
127.
Id. § 951(b)(2).
128.
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules for Say on
Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd–Frank Act (Jan. 25,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm.
129.
See Nelson, supra note 58, at 154.
130.
See STEPHEN DAVIS, YALE MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE &
PERFORMANCE, DOES ‘SAY ON PAY’ WORK?: LESSONS ON MAKING CEO COMPENSATION
ACCOUNTABLE 10–12 (2007), available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/sites/millstein.som.
yale.edu/files/Policy%20Briefing%20No%201%20'Say%20on%20Pay'.pdf; Gordon, supra
note 12, at 337–54.
131.
Ferri & Maber, supra note 76, at 21–22.
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compensation patterns.132 Most importantly, supporters contend that such data
reveals that say on pay increases board accountability because such data indicates
that say on pay votes do a good job of increasing the likelihood that boards will
pay closer attention to their obligation to ensure that compensation is appropriately
aligned with performance.
Critics question whether say on pay will have any impact on executive
compensation practices in the United States. Some insist that the differences
between America and the U.K. may undermine the extent to which similar results
could occur in America.133 Others point out that say on pay in the U.K. has had no
impact on overall compensation levels, nor has it resulted in more closely
connecting pay with performance at companies that perform well. 134
Critics also fear that say on pay will negatively impact executive pay
practices.135 As an initial matter, some worry about the efficacy of giving
shareholders a voice in compensation arrangements.136 In their view, pay practices
can be extremely complex, and shareholders may not have the knowledge to
provide valuable input into executive compensation decisions. 137 As a result,
shareholders—and hence boards—may inappropriately rely on proxy advisory
firms.138 Among other things, proxy advisory firms offer advice and guidance to
shareholders regarding how to vote.139 However, such advice may lack in quality
and integrity, making over-reliance on those votes potentially problematic.140 In
particular, over-reliance on proxy advisory firms may undermine innovation in
compensation practices, prompting shareholders to support overly conservative
pay practices. Studies of U.K. pay practices confirm that say on pay appears to
lead to an over-reliance on proxy advisors coupled with an increase in the
homogenization of pay practices, which could lead to suboptimal pay
arrangements at some firms.141
It is also possible that say on pay could lead to an increased reliance on
compensation consultants in a way that could prove counterproductive and
ultimately generate an increase in executive compensation at some companies. Not
132.
Gordon, supra note 12, at 337–40.
133.
See id. at 352–53.
134.
DAVIS, supra note 130, at 21–22; Ferri & Maber, supra note 76, at 21–26;
Lund, supra note 13, at 127–28.
135.
Even Ferri and Maber caution against interpreting their results about a
positive link between pay and performance to mean that say on pay will lead to superior
compensation practices. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 76, at 3–4.
136.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, REGULATION, Spring
2009, at 42, 47; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 695 (2010); Lund, supra note 13, at 129–30.
137.
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 136, at 695.
138.
Gordon, supra note 12, at 351–52. Evidence from the U.K. confirms such
heightened reliance. See DAVIS, supra note 130, at 12; Ferri & Maber, supra note 76, at 9.
139.
FAIRFAX, supra note 54, at 60–61.
140.
See infra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.
141.
See DAVIS, supra note 130, at 12–13; Gordon, supra note 12, at 351–52;
Lund, supra note 13, at 126–27.
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only do studies indicate that say on pay leads to increased reliance on
compensation consultants,142 but Dodd–Frank also encourages boards to rely on
such consultants.143 However, such reliance could have negative repercussions. A
report commissioned by the House of Representatives revealed a pervasive level of
conflicts of interest among compensation consultants.144 These conflicts
corresponded with higher levels of compensation. Thus, CEO salaries at
companies with conflicted consultants were significantly higher than the salaries at
companies that had engaged nonconflicted consultants. 145 In light of this evidence,
Dodd–Frank seeks to tackle the problems associated with conflicts related to
compensation consultants by implementing certain independence standards and
requiring certain disclosures.146 If these measures prove ineffective in reducing
conflicts of interest associated with compensation consultants, then say on pay
could also worsen pay practices at some companies.
Despite these criticisms, reformers have gravitated to say on pay based on
their belief that it could enhance board accountability. By giving shareholders a
voice in the compensation decision, say on pay is designed to ensure that directors
feel greater responsibility toward shareholders, thereby increasing the likelihood
that directors consider shareholder concerns in their compensation decisions. 147
Thus, say on pay is viewed as an antidote to board capture.
C. Say on Pay and Shareholder Derivative Suits
Some shareholders are also seeking to use say on pay to bolster director
accountability through fiduciary duty rules. By August 2011, at least nine
companies had been subjected to a lawsuit following a say on pay vote. Those
companies include: Bank of New York Mellon;148 Black and Decker;149 Beazer

142.
143.
144.

Gordon, supra note 12, at 351–52.
See Dodd-Frank Act § 952(b)–(c).
MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM,
EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS, i, 4 (2007),
available at http://www.erieri.com/PDF/Executive-Consultant-Conflicts.pdf.
145.
Id. at 6–7 (noting that the median salary and median salary increase were
higher at companies with highly conflicted compensation consultants).
146.
See Dodd–Frank Act § 952(a).
147.
Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Commissioner: “Restoring Investor Trust Through Corporate Governance”—Remarks
Before the Practicing Law Institute (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2009/spch021809ebw.htm (noting that say on pay promotes increased board
accountability); see also Gordon, supra note 12, at 337–40.
148.
CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, THE LATEST IN
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: “SAY-ON-PAY” BECOMES “SUE-ON-PAY” 1 (Oct. 2011),
available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Article_Say%20on%20Pay_
Allen_1006.pdf.
149.
Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. Investor Files Lawsuit Against Directors Over
Executive Pay, S’HOLDERS FOUND., http://shareholdersfoundation.com/case/stanley-blackdecker-inc-investor-files-lawsuit-against-directors-over-executive-pay (last visited Mar. 4,
2013) (describing case).
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Homes USA, Inc.;150 Cincinnati Bell, Inc.;151 Hercules Offshore, Inc.;152 Jacobs
Engineering Group, Inc.;153 KeyCorp;154 Occidental Petroleum Corp.;155 and
Umpqua Holdings Corp.156 The Bank of New York Mellon lawsuit stands out as
the only such suit brought after a successful say on pay vote; the other suits
followed failed say on pay votes. However, in each of the cases shareholders
allege significant deviations between corporate performance and executive pay. By
the end of 2011, the number of suits arising after a negative say on pay vote had
risen to at least 15, representing 35% of all companies with failed say on pay
votes.157
Such suits highlight shareholders’ belief that say on pay votes should
have repercussions for directors’ duties. All of the cases have claims involving

150.
Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Beazer Homes USA, Inc.,
Teamsters Local 237 Additional Security Benefit Fund v. McCarthy, No. 2011CV197841
(Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton Cnty. dismissed Sept. 15, 2011), appeal docketed, No. A12A00894
(Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/ExComp/
03_15_11_Beazer.pdf.
151.
Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Cincinnati Bell,
Inc., NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, No. 1:11-CV-00451 (S.D. Ohio dismissed July
18, 2012), available at http://articles.law360.s3.amazonaws.com/0255000/255911//mnt/
rails_cache/https-ecf-ohsd-uscourts-gov-doc1-14313621420.pdf.
152.
See Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Hercules
Offshore, Inc., Matthews, Sean (Derivatively on Behalf of Hercules v. Hercules Offshore
Inc.), No. 201134508 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cnty. dismissed Jun. 11, 2012), 2011 WL
2455436, available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/ExComp/06_06_11_
Matthews.pdf.
153.
Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Jacobs Engineering Group,
Inc., Witmer v. Martin, No. BC454543 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. dismissed Mar. 6, 2012),
2011 WL 3922597, [hereinafter Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. Complaint], available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/ExComp/02_04_11_Jacobs.pdf.
154.
See Verified Derivative Shareholder Complaint on Behalf of KeyCorp, King
v. Meyer, No. CV-10-730994, (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga Cnty. July 6, 2010), removal
docketed sub nom. In re KeyCorp Derivative Litigation, No. 1:10CV01786 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 12, 2010), 2010 WL 4526934, available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/
ExComp/07_06_10_King.pdf.
155.
See Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Occidental
Petroleum Corp., Gusinky v. Irani, No. BC442658 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. dismissed
Mar. 11, 2011), [hereinafter Occidental Petroleum Corp. Complaint], available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/ExComp/07_29_10_Occidental.pdf.
156.
Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on Behalf of Umpqua Holdings
Corp., Plumbers Local No. 137 Pension Fund v. Davis, No. 3:11-CV-633 (D. Or. dismissed
Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://clients.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/umpqua.pdf.
157.
GOOD ET AL., supra note 22, at 2; see also Beth I.Z. Boland & Sarah G. Kim,
How Companies Can Reduce Their Risk of Shareholder Litigation After a Failed “Say on
Pay” Vote, BINGHAM (June 11, 2012), http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2012/06/ReduceRisk-of-Shareholder-Litigation-After-Failed-Say-On-Pay-Vote (discussing the 17 say on
pay suits in 2011).
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fiduciary duty breaches.158 As an initial matter, shareholders argue that failed say
on pay votes reflect an independent business judgment that may negate the validity
of the company’s pay decisions and that such a vote should therefore rebut any
presumption that the directors complied with their fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation.159 Second, in light of the business judgment embedded
in the shareholders’ negative vote, shareholders contend that directors breached
their duty by approving compensation packages that were inconsistent with the
company’s disclosed compensation policies.160 Third, shareholders allege that
directors breached their duty because compensation packages resulted in a waste
of corporate assets.161
Despite shareholders’ efforts to link say on pay with directors’ duties, say
on pay suits have been dismissed at the pleading stage with overwhelming
frequency.162 Most commentators appear to agree with such dismissals, arguing
that say on pay suits have no traction both as a descriptive and normative matter.163
This Article contends that such dismissals are a mistake because they ensure that
fiduciary duty law plays virtually no role in the current reform effort. The next two
Parts address the rationales for disregarding the role of fiduciary duty law in this
area, and then challenge the validity of those rationales.

III. THE APPARENT IRRELEVANCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
At first glance, there are very good reasons to be both pessimistic and
dismissive regarding the impact of fiduciary duty law on director decision-making
regarding compensation matters. As an initial matter, courts appear unwilling to
play a strong role in this area, suggesting that shareholders will face significant
hurdles in their fiduciary duty litigation. Dodd–Frank and other reforms exacerbate
158.
Each of the suits names the executive compensation consultants as
defendants, alleging that they aided and abetted the directors’ conduct and that they
breached their contracts with the corporation. See Nelson, supra note 58, at 156.
159.
See id.
160.
See id.
161.
See id.
162.
GOOD ET AL., supra note 22, at 2; Boland & Kim, supra note 157 (noting that
only one of 17 suits had survived the motion to dismiss stage).
163.
See Peter M. Saparoff et al., Lessons Learned from Initial “Say-on-Pay”
Litigation, MINTZ LEVIN SECURITIES REGULATION ALERT (July 18, 2011),
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2011/Advisories/1251-0711-NAT-LIT/web.htm
(characterizing allegations as “relatively thin”); Michael D. Blanchard et al., Say on Pay:
Shareholder “No” Votes Now Leading to Derivative Actions Challenging Executive
Compensation, BINGHAM (July 7, 2011), http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?
MediaID=12582 (referring to the chances of succeeding say on pay suits that include
corporate waste claims as being slim); Martin Rosenbaum, If the Shareholders Say “NayOn-Pay,” Get Ready for “Sue-on-Pay,” ON SECURITIES (June 27, 2011),
http://www.onsecurities.com/2011/06/27/if-the-shareholders-say-nayonpay-get-ready-forsueonpay/; Kyoko Takahashi Lin & Gillian Emmett Modowan, Perceived Pay-forPerformance Disconnect Brings Say-On-Pay Shareholder Derivative Suits, DAVIS POLK
BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (June 24, 2011, 12:29 PM), http://www.davispolk.com/briefing/
corporategovernance/?entry=69 (referring to suits’ validity as questionable).
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this problem. Moreover, some may insist that fiduciary duty law is unnecessary,
given say on pay’s impact on compensation decisions. This Part fleshes out each of
these arguments, while Part IV demonstrates their flaws.
A. Fiduciary Duty Law’s Hands-Off Approach to Compensation Decisions
Under existing law, court interpretations of directors’ duties appear to
foreclose any possibility that say on pay would have an impact on directors’
fiduciary duty. In Delaware, shareholder derivative actions involve grappling with
two overarching issues: procedural rules embodied in the demand process, and
substantive rules.164 Courts’ analysis of both sets of rules makes it exceedingly
difficult for shareholders to successfully bring claims and hold directors liable for
breaching their duties,165 appearing to confirm the supposition that say on pay suits
will have little impact on director accountability.
1. The Demand Hurdle
The rules surrounding demand make it difficult to use fiduciary duty law
to curb director behavior because those rules make it difficult to even bring
lawsuits in this area. Before shareholders can bring a derivative suit they must
make a demand on the corporation or demonstrate with particularized facts that
demand is futile and therefore excused. 166 Shareholders make a demand by
requesting that the corporation assess the merits of their claims. 167 If the
corporation determines that the suit should not proceed, the corporation can seek to
terminate the suit by filing a motion to dismiss. 168 Shareholders can only defeat
such a motion if they prove that the corporation’s decision to dismiss the lawsuit
was wrongful.169 Such a standard is extremely deferential to corporations, making

164.
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?: Revitalizing
Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408–11 (2005).
165.
Id. at 401–15; see also infra note 170.
166.
E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807–08 (Del. 1984), overruled on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000); In re Citigroup
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del Ch. 2009); see also Carol B. Swanson,
Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the
Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1349 & n.55 (1993).
167.
Swanson, supra note 166, at 1349–50. In other words, demand involves
attempting to convince directors to bring suit against themselves or their current or former
colleagues. Id. The demand requirement is aimed at encouraging shareholders to rely on the
corporation’s internal procedures to resolve disputes. Id.; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. The
demand requirement is also aimed at reinforcing the corporation’s inherent power to
determine whether and to what extent it should bring suits to address alleged injuries to the
corporation. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 120.
168.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (“Consistent
with the purpose of requiring a demand, a board decision to cause a derivative suit to be
dismissed as detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and refused, will be
respected unless it was wrongful.”).
169.
Id.
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it almost impossible for shareholders who make a demand to defeat the
corporation’s motion to dismiss.170
By contrast, if shareholders can demonstrate that the demand is excused,
they have a greater likelihood of defeating the corporation’s motion to dismiss.
Given this likelihood, it makes sense that shareholders would choose to forego
making a demand and instead demonstrate that demand is excused as futile. 171 To
be sure, proving demand futility does not guarantee that shareholders will have
their day in court because corporations can still seek to dismiss the litigation. 172
However, if shareholders can demonstrate that demand is excused as futile, courts
evaluate the corporation’s motion to dismiss under a more stringent standard,
substantially increasing shareholders’ potential to move beyond the motion to
dismiss stage.173 Thus, proving demand futility is pivotal to shareholders’ ability to
maintain a successful derivative action.
In apparent recognition of this reality, say on pay shareholders, generally,
do not make pre-suit demands and instead argue that the demands were futile and
therefore excused.174 Under the rules established in Aronson v. Lewis, shareholders
can establish that demand is excused either by raising a reasonable doubt (1) about
the disinterest and independence of the directors on whom they would have had to

170.
See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 326
(1981); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 286 (1986) (noting that procedural rules have rendered liability rules ineffective);
Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First
Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 437 (1996) (noting the difficulty of getting claims through
court as a result of procedural rules).
171.
See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 807–08, 813–15.
172.
Zapata, 430 A.2d at 786.
173.
Courts evaluate the motion to dismiss under a more stringent standard
outlined in the two-part framework pronounced in Zapata v. Maldonado. See id. at 788–89.
In the first part of that analysis, Zapata shifts the burden to the corporation to prove that its
dismissal decision was appropriate, by showing that its committee was independent and
disinterested, conducted a reasonable investigation in good faith, and had a reasonable basis
for its recommendation. Id. In this part, courts require committees to engage in a process
that is “like Caesar’s wife”—“above reproach” when they evaluate shareholders’ claims.
See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1055
(Del. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985)). Even if
shareholders satisfy this burden, under the second prong of Zapata, courts make their own
independent assessment of whether the claims should be dismissed. Zapata, 430 A.2d at
789. Corporations must pass both prongs of Zapata in order for courts to honor the motion
to dismiss. To be sure, corporations—through their special litigation committees—are very
often successful in dismissing lawsuits even when demand is excused. But shareholders
who demonstrate demand futility have a much greater chance of avoiding termination of
their suit.
174.
See Nelson, supra note 58, at 170.
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make a demand or (2) that the challenged transactions resulted from a valid
exercise of the board’s business judgment.175
In their pre-suit demand arguments, shareholders raise assertions under
both prongs of Aronson. An evaluation of those arguments suggests that
shareholders will likely find it difficult to demonstrate demand futility and that
reforms enhance this difficulty.
2. Demand Futility and Independence
The first prong of Aronson involves shareholders demonstrating that
directors lacked the independence necessary to objectively assess the merits of
shareholders’ claims.176 Shareholders generally make such a demonstration by
pinpointing compromising ties on the part of directors or suggesting that the
liability risk created by the derivative suit is so high that directors cannot be trusted
to objectively determine whether the suit should proceed to trial. As this Section
reveals, satisfying this prong is exceedingly difficult.
a. Independence and Compromising Ties
In their say on pay derivative suits, shareholders do not directly challenge
boards’ independence by suggesting that directors have financial ties to the
corporation or executives that would undermine their ability to be objective. This
failure greatly diminishes shareholders’ ability to successfully challenge director
independence for the purpose of proving demand futility. When determining
whether a director lacks independence, courts focus primarily, if not exclusively,
on the extent to which such a director has a financial or other material relationship
with the corporation or if there are defendants that would interfere with her ability
to be objective.177 When such ties do not exist, it is almost impossible to challenge
a director’s independence for purposes of demonstrating demand futility. 178
Indeed, in the context of demand futility, the Delaware Supreme Court has not
only emphasized that directors are presumed to be independent but has stressed
that any ties other than economic or financial ones would normally be insufficient
to rebut this presumption. 179 Because courts place significant weight on financial
ties in assessing director independence, the failure of the say on pay suits to
pinpoint such ties greatly undermines their ability to prove demand futility on this
basis.

175.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
176.
Id.
177.
Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV.
127, 146–47 (2010).
178.
See id.
179.
See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845
A.2d 1040, 1048–54 (Del. 2004) (allegations of social, personal, or business relationships—
without more—cannot be used to rebut the independence presumption in the demand futility
context); E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L.
REV. 163, 173 (2004) (noting that noneconomic ties such as friendship and social relations
did not, standing alone, rebut director independence).
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b. Independence and Liability Risks
Shareholders are likely to face an uphill battle in proving demand futility
based on allegations regarding liability risks. Instead of focusing on compromising
ties, shareholders in each of the say on pay cases contend that demand is futile
because directors lack independence because of the high likelihood they will face
liability if the derivative action is successful. Although demand can be excused
based on the possibility of director liability, this possibility must be extremely
likely.180 Courts have held that the demand will not be excused as futile simply
because shareholders would be asking directors to sue themselves.181 Courts also
have repeatedly dismissed shareholder efforts to prove demand futility in executive
compensation cases where shareholders have alleged that directors breached their
duty by approving wasteful pay packages or otherwise failing to properly evaluate
the merits of such packages.182 Instead, because directors rarely incur liability for
compensation-related decisions, courts reason that their liability risks are not very
high.183 In this respect, it is almost a catch-22: Given the low liability risk
associated with suits related to executive compensation, shareholders will face an
uphill climb to show that directors have sufficient liability risk to justify excusing
demand.
3. Demand Futility and the Duty of Care
Shareholders face similar hurdles with trying to satisfy the second prong
of Aronson. That prong essentially requires shareholders to demonstrate that they
are likely to prevail on the merits of their claims by raising doubts that the
challenged transactions were consistent with directors’ fiduciary responsibilities.184
This Article examines shareholder allegations that fall into two broad categories:
claims involving a breach of the duty of care and claims involving waste.
As an initial matter, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate a breach of the
duty of care. When directors engage in misconduct that does not involve a conflict
of interest, their actions are evaluated under the duty of care. 185 Directors have a
duty of care to act in a reasonably informed manner and to take actions that
advance the corporation’s best interests.186 Courts analyze whether directors have
breached this duty of care under the business judgment rule. 187 The rule’s
presumption is that directors have acted in the best interests of the corporation.188
Courts rely on such a rule based on an extreme reluctance to second-guess the
180.
See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815; In re Citigroup S’holder Derivative Litig.,
964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009).
181.
In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 121.
182.
See id. at 138; Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387–89 (1997).
183.
See Zupnick, 698 A.2d at 387–89.
184.
See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811–12.
185.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985), overruled on
other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (2009); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
186.
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(1), (3) (2004).
187.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811–12.
188.
Id. at 812.
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business decisions of the board.189 Hence, in evaluating whether decisions satisfy
the business judgment rule, courts focus almost exclusively on the process by
which directors made their decision. 190 So long as the process is sufficient, courts
will not probe the substance of the decision, even if the decision can be viewed as
a poor one or a mistake. 191 Indicative of this relatively lax standard, only a handful
of cases have found directors liable for breaching their duty of care, and only one
case has imposed personal liability on directors for breaching their duty of care. 192
In this respect, the business judgment rule makes it extremely unlikely that
shareholders can prove demand futility by demonstrating a potential duty of care
breach.
The fact that say on pay cases involve executive compensation claims
only makes matters worse. Directors’ duty of care includes an obligation to take
appropriate care when establishing and approving executive pay packages. For
example, a breach of duty of care is when a shareholder claims that directors
breached their duty by approving pay packages that were not in the best interest of
the corporation. However, when analyzing the kind of process that directors must
meet in order to satisfy their duty of care involving executive compensation
decisions, courts have been tolerant of extremely lax procedures. With respect to
compensation decisions, courts begin by pointing out that directors’ decisionmaking process need not be pristine.193 Instead, courts have held that directors
satisfied their fiduciary duty even when directors follow a process that falls far
below best practices.194 Also, courts have found that directors satisfied their duty
of care even after characterizing their process as “casual, if not sloppy and
perfunctory.”195 In one case, directors were deemed to satisfy their duty of care
even when there were indications that their compensation decision was made
without sufficient information and deliberation regarding critical aspects of the

189.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985);
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
190.
See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811–12.
191.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
192.
See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099–1100
(1968) (finding only four cases); Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1055, 1059, 1062 (2006) (noting that outside director liability is almost
nonexistent); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 &
n.1–2 (1983) (finding only seven cases in which directors have been held liable for
breaching the duty of care); Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the
Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 982 (1994) (confirming a study
by Joseph Bishop).
193.
See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55–56 (Del. 2006).
194.
Id. at 55; White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553 (Del. 2001); Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 260–62 (Del. 2000); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996),
overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253; Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ. A. 19083NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2003).
195.
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
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compensation arrangement.196 Importantly, the court in one case acknowledged
that the challenged compensation appeared to be exceedingly lucrative when
compared to the value provided by the executive. 197 Thus, even when there is an
apparent pay-for-performance disconnect, Delaware courts require directors to
meet a fairly easy procedural hurdle, which almost eradicates any potential to
prove demand futility based on a breach of the duty of care.
4. Demand and Waste
The other avenue shareholders can pursue in their demand futility claim is
to demonstrate a significant likelihood that the challenged transactions are
wasteful. Some of the say on pay lawsuits allege that directors’ actions were
wasteful because directors approved payment schemes that gave executives
significant compensation despite their lackluster performance. 198
Like the duty of care more generally, proving demand futility with respect
to waste is extremely challenging. Waste claims are difficult to prove precisely
because courts do not feel comfortable second-guessing board decisions. Thus, a
board decision must be truly egregious to satisfy the waste claim. To excuse
demand based on waste, shareholders must plead facts that lead to an inference
that directors authorized a transaction that is so one-sided that no rational
businessperson would conclude that the corporation received proper consideration
for the transaction.199 One court described waste as involving a showing that “there
was ‘an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small
as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to
trade.’”200 Delaware courts have made clear that waste is almost impossible to
demonstrate.201 Hence, proving demand futility based on waste is also nearly
impossible.202
A demand futility claim based on waste is especially difficult when the
transaction involves executive compensation. Courts grant directors wide

196.
See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 56–57.
197.
See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
198.
See, e.g., Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. Complaint, supra note 153, at 15;
Occidental Petroleum Corp. Complaint, supra note 155, at 24.
199.
In re Citigroup S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. Ch.
2009); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998).
200.
In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263).
201.
See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748–49 (Del. Ch.
2005) (noting that corporate waste is very rarely found in Delaware courts); see also Andrea
M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 1005 (2009) (noting that
Delaware courts rarely find that directors have committed corporate waste); Julian Velasco,
How Many Fiduciary Duties are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1255–
56 (2010) (noting that waste requires shareholders to prove an extremely heavy burden that
is rarely satisfied).
202.
See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554–55 (Del. 2001); Brehm, 746 A.2d at
263–64; Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ. A. 19083-NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 & n.39 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 28, 2003).

32

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 55:1

discretion in the area of executive compensation. 203 This is because courts believe
that they are “ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of consideration under
the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business risk.”204
Hence, although there are cases in which courts have acknowledged that executive
compensation appears to be extremely lucrative or otherwise unconnected to
performance, courts have not been willing to characterize such compensation as
wasteful.205 In fact, the Delaware case that established the demand futility rules
involved a compensation agreement that guaranteed an executive’s compensation
for life and provided that the compensation would not be affected by the
executive’s inability to perform. 206 Although there were no allegations that he was
in poor health, the executive was 75 years old at the time directors approved the
agreement.207 When concluding that shareholders’ allegations were insufficient to
demonstrate demand futility based on waste, the court did not make any significant
probe into the reasonableness of the package, but rather emphasized directors’
broad powers to set compensation. 208 This underscores the extreme deference
courts grant directors, while highlighting the Herculean task say on pay
shareholders appear to face when seeking to prove demand futility.
5. On the Merits
Available empirical evidence has failed to unearth cases in which
directors have been held liable for committing waste or for breaching their duty
related to executive pay practices.209 This is likely correlated to the difficulties
shareholders confront when seeking to overcome the demand hurdle and get their
day in court related to such claims. 210 Yet even when shareholders manage to
overcome the significant hurdles involved with proving demand futility, available
empirical evidence indicates that they are never successful on the merits. 211
B. Dodd–Frank on Fiduciary Duty
Reforms appear to further undermine shareholder efforts to rely on
fiduciary duty rules to curb excessive executive compensation in at least three
ways. First, Dodd–Frank seeks to decouple say on pay from issues related to
fiduciary duty, undermining any effort to use say on pay as a platform for altering
fiduciary duty law related to executive compensation.212 Dodd–Frank states that
the say on pay vote may not be construed (a) as overruling board or corporate
decisions or (b) as creating or implying any change or addition to the fiduciary
203.
See Litt, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 n.39.
204.
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).
205.
See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 45–46.
206.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808–09 (Del. 1984).
207.
Id. at 809.
208.
Id. at 817–18.
209.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 45; Barris, supra note 18, at 84
(noting that no case has held directors liable for waste).
210.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing demand hurdle).
211.
See Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 880–81.
212.
See Dodd–Frank Act § 951(c).
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duties of the corporation or directors.213 In this way, Dodd–Frank appears to negate
shareholders’ efforts to use say on pay to reshape fiduciary duty law.
Second, Dodd–Frank encourages reliance on processes that are likely to
increase courts’ willingness to defer to directors’ compensation decisions, further
solidifying courts’ relatively hands-off approach to overseeing such decisions.
Compliance with Dodd–Frank almost guarantees that directors will be deemed free
from compromising ties, which further diminishes shareholders’ ability to
successfully prove demand futility based on the directors’ lack of independence.
Dodd–Frank requires compensation committees to be independent from the
corporation and its managers.214 Dodd–Frank also requires that directors select
compensation committee consultants and advisors only after their independence is
fully considered, including the amount of fees provided to such consultants,
business or personal relationships with committee members, the provision of other
services, and any potential conflicts of interest. 215 These rules direct the committee
to consider ties outside of financial ones.216 In this respect, Dodd–Frank’s rules
surrounding independence appear more stringent than those under Delaware law,
which does not take social or personal relationships into account in the
independence inquiry.217 More importantly, if boards satisfy such rules, their
actions significantly decrease the probability that courts will consider directors to
lack independence for demand futility purposes.218
Corporate adherence to reforms also increases the likelihood that courts
will look favorably upon the process by which directors determine compensation,
thereby virtually guaranteeing that courts will not delve too deeply into the
substance of those decisions. Post Dodd–Frank, compensation committees report
meeting longer, and more frequently, and focusing more attention on
compensation matters,219 thereby increasing the likelihood that they will be
deemed to have followed adequate procedures when setting executive pay. Dodd–
Frank’s director independence requirement, as well as its emphasis on
compensation consultants, should further safeguard board decisions from duty of
care challenges. Notwithstanding significant evidence questioning the validity of
relying on independent directors,220 courts view reliance on such directors as

213.
See id.
214.
Id. § 952(a).
215.
Id. § 952(b).
216.
Id.
217.
See Fairfax, supra note 177, at 146–48 (noting Delaware courts’
unwillingness to consider social ties in the independence inquiry); see also supra note 179.
218.
See supra Part III.A.2 (noting how proof of director independence undercuts
shareholders efforts to prove demand futility).
219.
SPENCER STUART, SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 2011, at 7, 27, available at
http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI_2011_final.pdf
(noting
that
directors ranked compensation matters as the number one issue on which they had to focus);
see also id. at 9 (noting increased meeting time and frequency even prior to enactment of
reforms).
220.
See Fairfax, supra note 177, at 174–76.
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important procedurally. 221 Thus, when independent directors make decisions,
courts give their decisions significant deference.222 Moreover, despite evidence
that compensation consultants may encourage excesses in executive pay, 223 courts
have suggested that reliance on outside consultants helps insulate compensation
decisions.224 Compliance with these reforms likely weakens shareholders’ chances
of attacking the validity of directors’ decisions.
From this perspective, the provisions underlying Dodd–Frank bolster the
view that fiduciary duty law will not play a role in regulating executive
compensation. Of course Part IV will illustrate that such a perspective may not be
entirely accurate. However, the perceived wisdom regarding the futility of
fiduciary duty suits sets the stage for reforms such as say on pay that shun reliance
on those suits.
C. The Promise of Say on Pay
The fact that say on pay has impacted director decision-making appears to
negate the need for fiduciary duty law.
1. Assessing the Vote Results
Available U.S. data indicates that shareholders have overwhelmingly
approved executive pay packages by wide margins. Say on pay votes became
mandatory on January 21, 2011.225 Current data incorporates votes covering nearly
two proxy seasons. In the 2011 proxy season, more than two-thirds of companies
received 90% or more support for their pay packages. 226 By contrast, only 1.6% of
companies had their pay packages rejected for that same period.227 Similarly, as of
September 2012, more than 70% of companies received 90% or more support for
their pay packages, with a slightly larger rejection rate of 2.6%. 228
Moreover, shareholders have approved such packages over the objection
of proxy advisory firms. Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder
Services (“ISS”)—by far the most dominant of such firms—issue
221.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981); Barris, supra
note 18, at 83; Fairfax, supra note 177, at 141–43; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of
Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 455–58 (2008).
222.
Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 785; Barris, supra note 18, at 83; Fairfax, supra
note 177, at 141–43; Rodrigues, supra note 221, at 455–58.
223.
See supra notes 141–45.
224.
See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 59–60 (Del. 2006).
225.
See Barrett & Hadler, supra note 125.
226.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 4 (indicating a 91.4% average shareholder
support, exceeding the 89.2% support for say on pay votes of TARP companies); COGENT
COMP. PARTNERS, supra note 55, at 1.
227.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 1; COGENT COMP. PARTNERS, supra note 55,
at 1; LITTENBERG ET AL., supra note 55, at 1. This rate of rejection was similar to the rate of
negative votes related to 2010’s TARP companies. Id.
228.
See SEMLER BROSSY, 2012 SAY ON PAY RESULTS: RUSSELL 3000
SHAREHOLDER VOTING 2 (2012), available at http://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/09/SBCG-SOP-2012-09-05.pdf.
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recommendations regarding how shareholders should vote. 229 There is
considerable debate regarding the extent to which such firms influence shareholder
voting.230 Consistent with this debate, many expressed concern that advisory firm
recommendations would significantly (and inappropriately) influence
shareholders’ willingness to approve executive pay arrangements.231 However, in
2011, 86% of companies that received a negative ISS recommendation garnered
approval for their pay packages.232 Moreover, the average support for companies
with a negative recommendation was about 73% in 2011,233 and roughly 64% in
2012.234 To be sure, shareholders in 2011 only rejected pay packages at companies
that also received a negative proxy firm recommendation. 235 Of course, one can
debate whether the recommendation influenced shareholder voting or simply
reflected shareholder concerns.236 Regardless, although a negative ISS
recommendation corresponded with lower shareholder support,237 shareholders
nevertheless strongly supported pay packages at the bulk of companies where such
recommendations were made.238 Such support is consistent with the broader trend
of shareholders approving highly lucrative pay packages by wide margins.
2. The Impact of Nay on Pay
The U.K. experience suggests that the percentage of negative pay votes in
the United States may be more significant than it appears. The rate of rejections in
the United States is higher than in the U.K. Over a period of six years, only eight239
or nine U.K. companies had their say on pay votes defeated.240 Evidence also
suggests that the percentage of negative votes increases as shareholders grow more
comfortable exercising their power. 241 If U.S. voting patterns mimic this
experience, then the rejection rates may increase over the next few proxy seasons.
229.
Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82
S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2009).
230.
See id. at 657–58, 696 (discussing critics’ concerns related to proxy advisory
firms and noting that such firms tend to issue recommendations that are consistent with the
issues about which shareholders are concerned).
231.
See David F. Larcker et al., The Economic Consequences of Proxy Advisor
Say-on-Pay Voting Policies 13–14 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ.,
Working Paper No. 119, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2101453.
232.
LITTENBERG ET AL., supra note 55, at 2.
233.
COGENT COMP. PARTNERS, supra note 55, at 2.
234.
See SELMER BROSSY, supra note 228, at 7.
235.
See id.
236.
See Choi et al., supra note 229, at 696–97 (noting that proxy
recommendations tend to reflect concerns of shareholders).
237.
A study by Cogent Compensation Partners found that a negative ISS
recommendation resulted in a 27.9% lower level of shareholder support. See COGENT COMP.
PARTNERS, supra note 55, at 2.
238.
See id.
239.
Lund, supra note 13, at 126 (pinpointing eight adverse shareholder votes
since say on pay’s adoption in the U.K.).
240.
Delman, supra note 6, at 610.
241.
See Delman, supra note 6, at 622–23.
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Hence, negative votes are already higher than those in the U.K. and are likely to
rise.
The relatively low percentage of negative votes may be viewed as a
positive signal, demonstrating that shareholders are exercising their vote
responsibly. Some opponents of say on pay were concerned that shareholders
would categorically reject pay practices at any firm where there was a pay-forperformance disconnect or where CEO salaries increased.242 However, many
corporations won approval of their pay practices even when there appeared to be a
disconnect between pay and performance. 243 Corporations received overwhelming
approval of pay packages despite a 33% increase in median CEO salaries at S&P
500 companies.244 Studies suggest that institutional shareholders have made efforts
not only to become more knowledgeable about compensation structures and
policies,245 but also to increase their engagement with directors around
compensation matters. As a result, even when a company’s pay practices could be
viewed as problematic, shareholders approved such practices so long as they
received some comfort that corporate managers had considered shareholder
concerns and were making efforts to address them. 246 In this respect, the low levels
of rejection could be viewed as a positive sign that shareholders have used their
rejection power sparingly and responsibly.
Negative say on pay votes not only prompted boards to consider different
pay practices, but also led boards to modify their practices in ways that
incorporated shareholder concerns. 247 For example, at least one company has
added performance metrics to its cash bonus program so such bonuses would be
contingent on corporate performance. 248 Another company added performance
conditions to previously issued restricted stock and stock options. 249 While it is too
soon to determine if these changes will be beneficial or have their intended result,
such changes reveal that shareholder rejection influences corporate conduct.
Proxy data reveals that negative votes related to frequency caused
companies to alter their frequency recommendations and policies. In the beginning
of the 2011 proxy season, many companies recommended that say on pay votes be
conducted every three years.250 However, shareholders tended to reject triennial
recommendations, instead clearly preferring annual votes. 251 In light of this
rejection, most companies shifted away from triennial recommendations toward
annual recommendations in the latter half of the proxy season. 252 Importantly,
242.
See LITTENBERG ET AL., supra note 55, at 1 (noting concerns about a potential
“knee-jerk reaction” from shareholders).
243.
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 10.
244.
Id. at 4.
245.
See Delman, supra note 6, at 609.
246.
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 12.
247.
See id.; COGENT COMP. PARTNERS, supra note 55, at 2.
248.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56 at 5; Nelson, supra note 58, at 197.
249.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 5.
250.
Id. at 13.
251.
See id.; COGENT COMP. PARTNERS, supra note 55, at 2 tbl.2.
252.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 13–14.
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although the frequency vote is advisory, most companies also have indicated that
they will follow the proposal favored by shareholders.253
A negative say on pay vote also has significant spillover effects. Perhaps
most significantly, existing evidence reveals that such votes impact shareholder
voting for directors. Thus, one study found that at companies where pay packages
were rejected, compensation committee directors received on average 13.5% fewer
votes than other directors on the ballot.254
3. The Impact of Yea on Pay
Even positive votes may reflect the influence of say on pay. For example,
positive say on pay votes may be a signal of corporations’ increased engagement
with shareholders. One potential benefit of say on pay is that it encourages more
effective board–shareholder communication, allowing directors and shareholders
to reach consensus on pay structures and policies, thereby eliminating the need for
conflict and any negative votes.255 Available empirical evidence reveals that when
ISS recommended a negative say on pay vote, many companies filed additional
disclosure documents aimed at clarifying and defending their compensation
practices.256 These efforts appeared to be successful because 73% of companies
that received a negative recommendation from ISS managed to get shareholder
approval of their packages, with an average shareholder support of 73%.257 Even
companies that received positive ISS recommendations reported reaching out to
shareholders prior to the say on pay vote. 258 In this regard, positive say on pay
votes may reflect companies’ more robust communication with shareholders. 259
Positive say on pay votes also may reveal corporations’ decisions to alter
pay arrangements in anticipation of such votes. Available empirical evidence
253.
See id. at 14.
254.
LITTENBERG ET AL., supra note 55, at 3. The 2011 ISS Report does note that
say on pay votes have contributed to a decline in overall opposition to directors because
such votes enabled shareholders to signal their discontent with directors by rejecting pay
packages rather than seeking to unseat directors. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 30.
255.
See John Borneman & Mark Emanuel, Top 5 Lessons from Say on Pay and
Shareholder Engagement, WORKSPAN, Sept. 2012, at 43, 46; MARC S. GERBER ET AL.,
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, 2013 INSIGHTS:
GOVERNANCE (2013), available at http://www.skadden.com/insights/governance-1.
256.
LITTENBERG ET AL., supra note 55, at 3–4; COGENT COMP. PARTNERS, supra
note 55, at 2–3.
257.
COGENT COMP. PARTNERS, supra note 55, at 2–3. According to ISS, 16.7% of
companies that received a negative recommendation from ISS also failed to receive
majority support for their pay packages.
258.
Reese Darragh, Companies Altering Compensation Plans over Say-on-Pay,
COMPLIANCE WK. (July 28, 2011), http://www.complianceweek.com/companies-alteringcompensation-plans-over-say-on-pay/article/208568/.
259.
See DAVIS, supra note 130, at 15; see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at
11–12 (noting that say on pay votes should be interpreted as a signal of increased
shareholder engagement). Empirical evidence from the U.K. found a noticeable increase in
board–shareholder communication in the wake of say on pay rules. Lund, supra note 13, at
126–27.
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indicates that companies prepared for the 2011 and 2012 say on pay votes by
instituting more performance-based compensation plans,260 changing their
compensation processes in a way that better responds to shareholder views. 261
4. Concluding Thoughts
It is too soon to tell if changes wrought by say on pay will prove
beneficial. On the one hand, policies advocated by shareholders may not result in
increasing the link between pay and performance or reducing the gap between
executive pay and the pay of average workers. On the other hand, even if
compensation policies have their intended impact on pay practices, it is not clear
whether or to what extent those policies will impact corporate performance or
reduce corporate misconduct.
However, say on pay has made directors more sensitive to shareholder
concerns, thereby boosting director accountability. Hence, one may legitimately
question the necessity of fiduciary duty law. The next Part responds to that
question.

IV. RECONFIRMING THE RELEVANCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY LAW
In contrast to the previous Part, this Part not only makes the normative
case for why courts should use say on pay litigation to alter the manner in which
they assess executive compensation decisions, but also insists that Dodd–Frank
should not serve as an impediment to that alteration.
A. Dodd–Frank as an Invitation
Rather than construing Dodd–Frank as a prohibition against alterations in
fiduciary duty law, it could be construed as federal legislators’ exercise of
deference coupled with an invitation for state courts to re-examine fiduciary duty
law. Several corporate governance scholars have sharply criticized previous
federal reforms because they intruded on corporate governance matters generally
regulated under state corporate law. 262 Dodd–Frank’s provisions on fiduciary duty
law may be viewed as a response to this criticism. In this respect, it may be a
mistake to conclude, as some courts have, that Dodd–Frank aims to preserve the
existing framework with respect to fiduciary duty law. 263 This is particularly true

260.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 12; see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP,
SAY-ON-PAY REVIEW OF 2012 PROXY SEASON RESULTS 4–5 (2012), available at
http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/e294c919-4351-4d6c-a6d1-06914f0f36d6/Prese
ntation/PublicationAttachment/d4a5c6b3-1140-4eb7-8942-d3dc71655a67/Say-on-Pay_Revi
ew_of_2012_Proxy_Season_Results_7-20-2012.pdf.
261.
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 56, at 12; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra
note 260, at 2; Darragh, supra note 258.
262.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate
Law, REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 26; Larry Ribstein, Market-Based Regulatory Responses
to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 57–59 (2002).
263.
See Nelson, supra note 58, at 185 (describing, for example, the Fulton
County Superior Court’s reasoning in say on pay suits).
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given federal legislators apparent disappointment with the accountability
mechanism under state law, including fiduciary duty law. 264 Indeed, it is more
likely that federal regulators may welcome state reform in this area, and thus that
Dodd–Frank should be viewed as an effort to recognize the states’ authority in this
area. Such clear recognition does not prohibit state courts from making changes to
fiduciary duty law. In this respect, Dodd–Frank should not serve as a bar to state
court efforts aimed at altering the standard for reviewing fiduciary duty breaches
related to executive pay.
B. Debunking the Relevancy Myth
This Section advances the case for enhancing the courts’ role in
regulating fiduciary duty breaches related to executive compensation decisions
from both a descriptive and normative perspective. As a descriptive matter, the
Section debunks the widely held belief that courts have been categorically
unwilling to scrutinize director pay decisions more closely. This Section also
reveals how disclosure rules may reduce a court’s concerns regarding its capacity
to properly assess such decisions, which increases the likelihood that courts can
oversee director decisions in a measured manner. Normatively, the Section
highlights several reasons why courts should embrace such oversight, including
reasons related to the limits of say on pay, the importance of state regulation, and
the importance of an appropriately balanced shareholder voice.
1. A Second Look at Fiduciary Duty
Contrary to the perceived wisdom on this issue, courts have been willing
to play a more enhanced role in monitoring pay decisions—at least episodically.
The Delaware Supreme Court recently underscored the potential for shareholders
challenging compensation decisions to demonstrate demand futility based on
waste. In Brehm v. Eisner, the Court noted that “there is an outer limit to [the
board’s] discretion [to set executive compensation], at which point a decision of
the directors on executive compensation is so disproportionately large as to be
unconscionable and constitute waste.”265 This language appeared to open the door
for a more rigorous analysis of compensation claims under the waste doctrine.
In a shareholder derivative action involving Citigroup, the Delaware
Chancery Court relied on that dicta from Brehm v. Eisner when it allowed
shareholders challenging an executive compensation decision to survive a motion
to dismiss.266 In that case, directors approved a $68 million retirement payment for
a CEO who retired after the company suffered billions of dollars in losses. 267 The
court found that the payment agreement failed to demonstrate the value of the

264.
See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
265.
746 A.2d 244, 262 n.56 (Del. 2000) (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602,
610 (Del. Ch. 1962)).
266.
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. Ch.
2009) (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)).
267.
Id. at 138.
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services being provided in exchange for such a payment.268 As a result, the court
concluded that there was reasonable doubt regarding whether the agreement was
one-sided, and thus wasteful, which satisfied the demand futility standard.269 In
light of the historical reluctance to excuse demand based on waste, experts agree
that this case seems to weaken the heavy burden imposed on shareholders. 270
The courts’ pronouncements in Citigroup and Brehm negate blanket
assumptions that lawsuits in this area are not viable. Although shareholders clearly
confront a heavy burden, it may not be insurmountable. Instead, waste appears to
be a viable measure to plead demand futility in a manner that allows a suit to
proceed on the merits.
Moreover, outside of these recent decisions, there is evidence that courts
have been willing to provide more exacting scrutiny of executive compensation
decisions, even if only episodically. Many contend that fiduciary duty law is an
inappropriate vehicle for policing pay practices because courts are ill-equipped to
evaluate decisions related to compensation, whereas boards are better positioned to
analyze the sufficiency of pay arrangements.271 This concern about judicial
competency animates the wide discretion courts afford boards when assessing
fiduciary duty claims. However, courts have recognized that when there exists a
possibility that directors may abuse their discretion, a more stringent standard of
review is necessary. More importantly, courts have applied more exacting scrutiny
even in connection with executive compensation matters, suggesting that there are
circumstances in which courts are able to overcome these competency concerns.272
Thus, after reviewing almost 90 years of reported cases, Professors Randall
Thomas and Harwell Wells conclude that “[c]ontrary to the received
wisdom . . . courts have not been uniformly hostile to challenges to executive
compensation. From time to time, courts have applied heightened scrutiny to either
the process or substance of executive compensation decisions.”273 This evidence
reveals that although the complexity of compensation decisions has made courts
reluctant to interfere with them, there have been times when courts have overcome
that reluctance and thus looked more closely at executive pay practices.
2. Help from Corporate Disclosure
Say on pay suits primarily challenge board decision-making by referring
to corporate disclosures regarding pay policies and suggesting that there is a
268.
See id.
269.
See id. at 139.
270.
See, e.g., Steven C. Caywood, Note, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine:
How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive
Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 119 (2010).
271.
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997); see Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting the importance of boards exercising their
business judgment in context of claims related to executive pay); See also BEBCHUK &
FRIED, supra note 18, at 45 (discussing inadequacy of courts regarding executive
compensation).
272.
See Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 880.
273.
See id.
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disconnect between a particular pay package and such disclosures. 274 Along these
same lines, such disclosures enable courts to analyze the appropriateness of board
decisions with reference to a board’s own stated policies. Such an analysis may
help alleviate the courts’ concerns about capacity for several reasons. First, it does
not require courts to assess the appropriateness of compensation per se—an
assessment that is not only challenging, and potentially outside of the realm of
judicial competency given the wide divergence in views regarding appropriate pay
levels, but also one that may be better determined by the directors who are elected
by shareholders. Second, by focusing on whether a particular compensation
package is compatible with disclosed policies, these disclosures enable courts to
defer to the directors’ decision regarding appropriate pay policies at their
companies. Third, it does not require courts to apply a one-size-fits-all model of
compensation, and thus does not stifle private ordering or innovation by
corporations. To be sure, focusing on corporate disclosure does not resolve all the
complexity issues associated with seeking to measure the appropriateness of
executive compensation, particularly because such disclosure may be too broad to
provide meaningful guidance.275 However, at the very least, it does provide a
critical starting point in this area, and in many cases a robust measuring tool for
analyzing executive compensation. By providing courts with at least the
beginnings of a yardstick by which to measure each pay package, corporate
disclosures not only facilitate court oversight in this area, but also may enable that
oversight to be less onerous and intrusive.
3. The Limits of Say on Pay
The foregoing two Subsections demonstrate why directors can oversee
board decisions. The next Subsections illustrate why courts should engage in such
oversight. As an initial matter, although say on pay votes (whether negative or
positive) appear to influence corporate decision-making related to executive
compensation, it would be unwise to rely exclusively on say on pay to fill the
accountability gap. Corporations can, and have indicated that they will, ignore say
on pay votes. Say on pay votes, like most shareholder proposals, are nonbinding. 276
As a result, corporations are not required to change their practices or policies
because of a negative vote. Empirical evidence reveals that in the past corporations
routinely ignored shareholder proposals even when they received significant
shareholder support over several years. 277 Such evidence underscores the fragility
of the say on pay vote. Hence, such votes may be only a partial solution to

274.
See Nelson, supra note 58, at 173.
275.
See id. at 195.
276.
See Dodd–Frank § 951(c).
277.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 854–55 (2005) (looking at shareholder resolutions regarding staggered
boards). But see Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When
Shareholders Say Yes?: Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 68–70
(2004) (noting that just because directors ignore votes does not mean that they are acting
inappropriately).
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excessive pay practices, which underscores the continued need for fiduciary duty
law.
Fiduciary duty litigation also may serve as a critical supplement to say on
pay. Indeed, companies whose pay practices were rejected by courts failed to
consider shareholder concerns both before the shareholder vote and afterwards.
However, such companies have announced significant changes to their executive
compensation practices following the institution of shareholder derivative suits. 278
In this respect, lawsuits may be more effective at prompting responses from
particular companies. There also is a possibility that the threat of lawsuits may
enhance the influence of the say on pay vote by encouraging directors to pay heed
to shareholder concerns in order to avoid such suits. In this way, lawsuits may
have a critical role to play even with the existence of say on pay.
Given that say on pay cannot completely fill the accountability gap, it is
critical that fiduciary duty law have some role in policing executive compensation.
Because fiduciary duty law is the primary accountability mechanism at the state
level, it seems inappropriate to allow courts to excuse themselves from their
policing responsibilities.
4. Counteracting Bias
There is a strong likelihood that compensation decisions as a general
matter may be negatively influenced by compromising ties, warranting increased
scrutiny of such decisions. When there is a possibility that directors’ decisions may
result from bias, or may be influenced by their relationships with managers,
Delaware courts apply a higher level of scrutiny to those decisions. 279 In this
respect, while courts may afford directors deference based on a concern about their
competency to judge business decisions, courts put aside that deference and
concern for decisions or cases in which deference may not be appropriate.
Compensation decisions are precisely the kind of decisions where that
deference needs to be put aside for at least two reasons. First, there is a high
probability that director decisions on this issue are influenced by relationships that
undermine directors’ objectivity and therefore merit closer judicial attention.
Indeed, when assessing the kinds of relationships that may undermine a director’s
objectivity, courts focus only on economic or financial relationships.280 Thus,
despite social science research revealing the compromising nature of social ties

278.
See LITTENBERG ET AL., supra note 55, at 4.
279.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785–86 & n.14 (Del. 1981).
Such heightened scrutiny occurs when directors are in a position to exert undue influence
over shareholders, or when directors approve conflict-of-interest transactions that confer
benefits upon them not enjoyed by shareholders. Fairfax, supra note 177, at 142–43 (noting
heightened judicial review for transactions involving self-dealing); see also Rales v.
Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935–36 (Del. 1993); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need
for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 846–48 (2004).
280.
See supra note 179.
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and structural bias,281 courts have been largely unwilling to consider the impact of
such ties when evaluating director behavior.282 As a result, courts have deferred to
compensation decisions made by directors who have strong social ties with
executives. For example, Disney’s board chair Michael Eisner orchestrated the
compensation package of Michael Ovitz, who received some $140 million after
having served as president for little more than a year. 283 In assessing Eisner’s
independence, the court gave no weight to the fact that Eisner had been friends
with Ovitz for some 25 years.284 By failing to appropriately consider the
compromising nature of these noneconomic ties, the court gave undue deference to
Eisner and missed an opportunity to challenge his compensation decision. Such a
failure should be rectified. Courts should consider the impact of noneconomic ties
in the same way they consider the impact of other ties that undermine directors’
objectivity and therefore necessitate more exacting judicial scrutiny. To be sure,
courts’ refusal to consider noneconomic ties applies to all decisions. However, that
refusal may be particularly problematic for executive compensation decisions
because of the extreme deference courts appear to grant those decisions.
Second, there is a high probability that director decisions in this area are
influenced by inappropriate biases that skew such decisions in favor of
management. Like noneconomic ties, courts tend to ignore theories suggesting that
directors who are former or current executives tend to have a bias toward giving
managers the freedom to make decisions, and are otherwise unduly influenced by
management in ways that result in their approval of higher compensation. 285
Ignoring this evidence is particularly problematic given that a significant number
of directors are active or former executives. 286 Directors who are current or former
executives are not only most likely to serve on the compensation committee, but
are also most likely to chair that committee. 287 A 2010 board study revealed that
63% of committee chairs were active or retired CEOs. 288 In light of the evidence
indicating such directors’ bias with respect to pay practices, their domination on
the compensation committee is troubling. Moreover, such domination bolsters the
case for courts to apply more searching scrutiny in this area.
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See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:
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5. The Importance of a State Voice
Another critical reason why fiduciary law should be revitalized is that
there are benefits to relying on regulation at the state level through the
enforcement of state fiduciary duty laws, as opposed to looking exclusively at
federal regulation. Relying on fiduciary duty law enables us to take advantage of
these benefits.
Enhancing fiduciary duty law may be an important mechanism for
counteracting any of the potentially negative repercussions of increased
shareholder influence in this area. Shareholders are clearly concerned about
excessive executive compensation. Moreover, they have clearly demonstrated that
they will agitate for reform in this area. This is reflected in the dominance of
executive compensation issues in the shareholder proposal process. 289 More
importantly, many critical shareholder empowerment campaigns were rooted in
shareholder frustration with executive compensation. 290 This includes the majorityvote movement, the acceleration of withhold-the-vote campaigns, and the
campaign to eliminate discretionary broker voting. 291 Importantly, these campaigns
have garnered support where many others have not.292 One critical reason why
shareholders have increased their activism is their frustration with the courts’
unwillingness to play a more significant role in the process. Importantly, the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Disney to refrain from holding directors
liable for their haphazard decision-making and their approval of a seemingly
excessive pay package ignited shareholder fury and accelerated shareholders’
activism surrounding a host of executive pay reforms.293 In this regard, if courts
indicate a willingness to play a more effective role in managing executive
compensation, it is likely to reduce shareholder activism in this area, which can be
costly and distracting to both shareholders and corporations.
State courts also should reconsider their approach to fiduciary duty law in
order to avoid further federal intrusion in this area. The public outrage and
corresponding wave of federal reforms clearly underscore the federal
government’s deep concern with corporate pay practices, as well as the
government’s increased willingness to police those practices in ways that intrude
on states’ traditional authority. To be sure, in light of the efforts made under
Dodd–Frank to preserve states’ role in fiduciary law, such intrusion may be
construed as measured. However, there is no guarantee that further inroads will not
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occur. Instead, it is entirely possible that if state courts persist in not playing a role
in better policing compensation arrangements, public outrage could prompt more
drastic federal intrusion. Viewed through this lens, Dodd–Frank may be viewed as
a warning that state inaction could lead to a minimization of state’s role in this
area.
Significant federal intrusion could be problematic. Indeed, the primary
justification for federalism in general and the enabling nature of state corporate
laws in particular is that they foster innovation and healthy risk-taking.294 By
contrast, federal regulations, which often come in the form of uniform mandates,
are viewed as stifling innovation in a way that could lead to suboptimal decisionmaking. Notably, the dominant critique of federal intervention in corporate law
centers around the undesirability of displacing the innovation that often stems from
private ordering with federal mandates. This critique highlights the necessity of the
states’ role in corporate governance practices.
However, to the extent there is any validity to the federalism claim, it is
likely that fiduciary duty law also must play a central role in corporate governance
practices. There is considerable debate regarding whether corporations and states
have sufficient incentives to innovate at optimal levels. 295 In the context of
executive compensation, there is every reason to believe that federalism—that is,
the notion that states and corporations should be allowed to generate policies free
from federal intrusion—may have encouraged excessive risk-taking and permitted
inefficient pay practices, particularly with respect to pay policies for banks.296
However, federal mandates not only may encourage inefficient homogenization of
such practices,297 but they may also encourage undue reliance on mechanisms that

294.
Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP.
L. 99, 100 (2004); Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and
State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 246–47 (2006); see also
Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 147–52
(2003) (discussing innovation and its benefits to shareholders).
295.
Much of this federalism debate related to corporate law focuses on the
competition for state charters, and the question of whether that competition produces a race
to the top or a race to the bottom. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (setting forth the race to the bottom
theory); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 479–83 (1987) (finding flaws with both
theories); Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON.& ORG. 225, 280–81 (1985) (finding that state competiton results in a race to the
top); see also Abramowicz, supra note 294, at 153–59, 168–70 (explaining limits on firm
and state innovation and referring to the race as a “crawl”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 271
(1977) (advancing the race to the top theory).
296.
See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 6; Karl S. Okamato, After the Bailout:
Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 185 (2009); Tung, supra note 6.
297.
See Gordon, supra note 12, at 325–26 (noting that a federal mandate may
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undermine accountability and increase the potential for excessive pay. 298 These
observations suggest that even though the benefits of federalism may be
overstated, such benefits may nevertheless exist and thus should be harnessed. 299
State fiduciary duty law has a vital role to play in such an endeavor.300 Corporate
fiduciary law serves as the primary check on corporate innovation and risk-taking,
ensuring that such actions occur within acceptable boundaries.301 From this
perspective, federalism may be undesirable if we cannot depend upon state
fiduciary duty law to police corporate innovation. More importantly, the federal
government may be less inclined to allow states and corporations the freedom to
innovate if it cannot be assured that fiduciary duty law will play a role in curbing
excesses associated with such innovation.
C. Say on Pay as the Perfect Storm
This Section argues that say on pay is an ideal platform for courts to use in
their efforts at reinvigorating their oversight regarding compensation matters for
several reasons. Because directors’ fiduciary responsibilities include appropriately
considering shareholder concerns, the results of shareholders’ vote on
compensation matters should play some role in courts’ analysis regarding whether
directors effectively performed such responsibilities. The rarity of shareholder
rejection in this area only underscores the importance of ensuring that boards and
courts pay closer attention to such rejections when analyzing board adherence with
their duties. Finally, the fact that the absolute number of negative say on pay votes
has been relatively low necessarily limits the number of potential cases in this area,
increasing the likelihood that courts may be able to provide important signals
regarding pay practices in an environment where the costs of litigation may be
lower as compared to the potential cases that can be brought with regard to
compensation matters more generally.
1. Shareholder Concerns and the Say on Pay Vote
One justification for increasing judicial scrutiny in the context of say on
pay suits relates to the importance of ensuring that boards consider shareholder
concerns in their pay decisions.
Corporate governance experts agree that boards have an obligation to
consider shareholder concerns, and courts should ensure that boards take that
obligation seriously. In 2009, The Conference Board convened a task force of
298.
Thus, critics contend that federal reforms focus on director independence
resulting in reliance on compensation consultants that prove inefficient and could even lead
to increased compensation packages. See supra notes 134–35.
299.
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corporate governance experts to address problems associated with executive
compensation pay processes and oversight. 302 The task force issued a report and
recommendation, which contained five guiding principles, including one focused
on maintaining credible board oversight.303 As part of the oversight principle, The
Conference Board argued that in order for boards to perform their oversight roles
effectively, they should “[t]hink and act like an owner.”304 Hence, governance
experts agree that directors fulfill their oversight responsibilities only when they
appropriately consider shareholder concerns.305
The negative say on pay vote reflects a very important embodiment of
shareholder concerns. The fact that shareholders’ assessment diverges significantly
from the directors’ assessment suggests that directors may not be “thinking [or
acting] like owners” in the manner recommended by The Conference Board.306
2. The Strength of the Signal
Shareholder rejection is significant not only because it is relatively rare,
but also because it is often difficult for shareholder proposals that run counter to
managerial recommendations to obtain majority shareholder approval. Such
difficulties arise from the fact that shareholders have diverse interests and may not
agree on particular policies,307 as well as the fact that most shareholders tend to
follow management recommendations. 308 Historically, there were very few issues
on which shareholders managed to garner majority support. 309 From this
perspective, the fact that a majority (and in many cases a substantial majority) of
shareholders agree that a pay package is problematic should be viewed as
significant and should be given weight when assessing the appropriateness of
executive compensation packages.
3. Minimizing the Impact of Litigation
Because a negative say on pay vote is relatively rare, any heightened
scrutiny surrounding litigation related to such votes will be reserved to a subset of
companies and their compensation decisions. Thus, even if shareholders decided to
aggressively pursue litigation in this area, the absolute number of potential cases is
limited. This potentially minimizes the amount of litigation in this area, while
enabling courts to send an important message about the boundaries of acceptable
pay practices. Importantly, it generally only takes one case to set the tone
regarding the appropriate role of directors. Thus, even if there are relatively few
302.
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challenges in this area, Delaware only needs to consider and decide one case in
order to make a lasting impact on director behavior. This means that paving the
way for increased litigation of this variety is more ideal than litigation regarding
compensation issues more generally simply because the latter pool is far greater
than the pool involving say on pay suits.
Of course, some may be concerned that the mere fact that say on pay
votes could impact fiduciary duty law will influence shareholder voting. On the
one hand, shareholders may be concerned about the serious repercussions that
could stem from their vote and hence may be more reluctant to reject pay
packages. On the other hand, some shareholders may use the say on pay vote
strategically to increase their chances of success in the litigation process. As a
result, litigation-minded shareholders may increase the frequency with which they
reject pay packages. To be sure, it is difficult to make predictions in this area.
However, current evidence suggests that there may not be significant cause for
concern. While the number of negative say on pay cases increased from 2011 to
2012, the total percentage of failed say on pay votes remained relatively small at
2.6%.310 Commentators have also indicated that shareholders have refined their
analysis of problematic pay practices, 311 which inturn suggests that any suits based
on these negative votes may be qualitatively better, making it easier for courts to
provide signals regarding how directors may have fallen short of their obligations.
D. Toward Reform
In light of the foregoing discussion, this Article argues that Delaware
courts should use say on pay votes to alter the standard by which they examine
compensation decisions. Delaware courts may find that such an alteration is
beneficial because it enables them to reestablish their prominence in this area. The
following discussion sets forth modest and radical proposals for reform.
1. A Modest Proposal
Shareholders have argued that their negative say on pay votes should
rebut the presumption afforded under Aronson that the directors’ decision resulted
from sound business judgment and hence satisfy demand futility.312 This Article
stops short of advocating that such a vote should entirely satisfy the demand
futility rules, which is consistent with at least one court’s formulation of the presuit demand requirement.313 Indeed, directors should not be compelled to follow
shareholder preferences when they could prove detrimental to the best interests of
the corporation. This is particularly true if the shareholder vote was rejected by a
bare majority. Also, courts should take into account whether and to what extent
directors have considered shareholder concerns when making their pay decisions.
Hence, there may be circumstances in which directors have appropriately
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considered shareholder concerns and thus their actions should be viewed in a
favorable light despite a negative say on pay vote.
Nevertheless, the negative say on pay vote should be given considerable
weight in the demand-futility context, particularly when the percentage of negative
votes is substantially more than a majority. As the preceding Section suggests, the
rarity of such shareholder rejection coupled with the directors’ obligation to
consider shareholder concerns in their decision-making process justifies giving the
say on pay vote considerable weight in the demand-futility inquiry. Moreover, the
potential that pay decisions will be colored by bias and other inappropriate
influences should prevent courts from affording their traditional deference to
director decisions in this area. In this respect, the say on pay vote not only should
trigger reduced deference but should also carry significant weight in courts’
assessment regarding whether to excuse demand as futile.
Altering the rules related to demand futility should have a significant
impact on fiduciary duty law. Changing those rules increases the likelihood that
shareholders can move beyond the motion to dismiss stage. As a result, such a
change not only increases the potential for favorable settlements in this area but
also increases the likelihood that fiduciary duty rules will deter inappropriate
director behavior by revealing that such rules pose a credible threat of liability.
Altering rules at the demand futility stage also may be viewed as the ideal
response to judicial competency concerns, and thus altering such rules may have a
better chance of being embraced. Because the demand futility assessment does not
require courts to make an ultimate judgment either about the adequacy of the
executive compensation at issue, or about the appropriateness of director conduct,
there is a stronger likelihood that judges will feel comfortable applying enhanced
scrutiny at such a stage. This is underscored by the fact that courts have been
willing to impose more exacting scrutiny at the demand futility stage for claims
related to excessive compensation in certain circumstances.314 Thus, there is
precedent for this kind of reform.
2. A Radical Proposal
It is also possible that courts can use the say on pay rules to shift the
burden of proof at the substantive stage of a say on pay lawsuit. In their say on pay
suits, shareholders have suggested that directors should be required to prove that
their compensation decisions are consistent with their compensation policies.
Thus, shareholders have pinpointed corporate compensation policies as disclosed
in the proxy statement and other public documents and have argued that particular
compensation arrangements are inconsistent with such policies. In each case,
although corporations purport to embrace a pay-for-performance philosophy,
directors approve pay packages that do not make sufficient allowances for poor
performance.315 In the shareholders’ view, the inconsistency between policy and

314.
See Thomas & Wells, supra note 18, at 880.
315.
When shareholders contend that there is a pay-for-performance disconnect,
this disconnect often stems from the fact that executive compensation is not conditioned on
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practice is indicative of a breach of directors’ duties. Moreover, in making this
argument, shareholders appear to suggest that a negative say on pay vote should
require directors to demonstrate the validity of their decisions, at least as measured
against their purported policies.
Consistent with such a suggestion, it is possible for Delaware (or other)
courts to use the negative say on pay vote to shift the burden of proof so that
directors do have to defend their pay practices. On the one hand, this Article’s
discussion regarding the complexity of compensation decisions underscores the
difficulty of encouraging courts to delve into the substance of compensation
decisions. As a result, any reform that requires courts to judge the sufficiency of
pay decisions may be viewed as problematic. On the other hand, a burden-shifting
reform has appeal. Indeed, shareholders tend to reject pay packages at companies
where there is a severe disconnect between pay and performance. When this
disconnect is at odds with corporate policy, it may be reasonable to require
directors to explain that divergence. Such a requirement will make it unnecessary
for courts to judge the adequacy of compensation. Rather, they will assess the
adequacy of the board’s explanations about compensation—a potentially less
onerous task. Moreover, because shareholders tend to reject pay packages in which
the disconnect between pay and performance is significant, it is likely that courts
will be focused on the most egregious cases, which may make assessing those
cases much easier.
Of course, any reform that encourages Delaware courts to challenge
directors’ decisions on their face, or otherwise seeks to hold directors liable for
those decisions, faces an uphill battle. Indeed, while courts have been willing to
apply increased rigor at the demand or procedural stage, courts have not been
willing to overturn the substance of a compensation decision. 316 Therefore, this
proposal is more radical and less feasible. However, there are sufficient reasons for
courts to enhance their scrutiny of pay arrangements, and negative say on pay
votes offer an ideal starting point, particularly because they may represent a
relatively small universe of cases.

CONCLUSION
Although outrage over excessive executive compensation has prompted
reforms, those reforms have ignored the role of fiduciary duty law. Instead,
executive compensation reforms have sought to enhance board accountability
through measures outside of that law. This Article contends that such an effort is a
mistake and insists that fiduciary duty law should play a role in curbing excessive
executive compensation.
Say on pay is one of the most prevalent executive compensation reforms.
In the wake of negative say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought lawsuits
performance metrics or goals, resulting in executives being paid high levels of
compensation even when financial performance dips. Pay-for-performance seeks to craft
pay packages so that they are contingent on performance goals. See, e.g., SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL LLP, supra note 260, at 9–10.
316.
See id. at 13 n.17.
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against directors, arguing that the negative say on pay votes indicate that such
directors have breached their fiduciary duty. This Article argues that these lawsuits
may present a welcome opportunity for courts to reshape fiduciary duty law and
reconfirms that law’s relevance to the executive compensation debate.
To be sure, courts historically have been reluctant to interfere in the
executive pay decision. However, this Article advances several reasons why that
interference is necessary and appropriate, particularly in the context of say on pay
suits. Say on pay is an ideal platform for courts to reinvigorate fiduciary duty law
related to compensation matters. Corporate governance experts believe that
directors’ duties with respect to executive compensation include appropriately
considering shareholder concerns. The say on pay vote is an important
embodiment of those concerns. A negative say on pay vote is a strong signal that
something is awry with pay practices, particularly because such votes are relatively
rare and require that a broad cross-section of shareholders agree on the
inappropriateness of executive pay. Because negative votes are relatively low, any
heightened scrutiny surrounding litigation in this area will be reserved to a subset
of companies and their compensation decisions, potentially minimizing the amount
of litigation in this area, while enabling courts to send an important message about
the boundaries of acceptable pay practices. Then too, because corporations
disclose their pay practices, courts can limit their determination to whether
particular compensation packages are consistent with such practices. Such
limitation may be an important response to concerns that courts may be less
equipped to judge the adequacy of given compensation packages per se. In this
regard, say on pay offers a way for courts to play a relatively limited, albeit
critical, role in overseeing executive pay.
As this Article argues, Delaware courts should embrace the opportunity
presented by say on pay for several important reasons. As an advisory measure,
say on pay may be insufficient on its own to impact the range of problematic pay
practices at companies simply because companies are not required to alter their
behavior as a result of negative say on pay votes. To be sure, even if say on pay
could do a lot of work in this space, it seems inappropriate to let fiduciary duty law
off the hook, particularly given than courts are supposed to play a role in policing
these decisions. And contrary to conventional wisdom suggesting that courts have
categorically refused to pass on the sufficiency of executive pay decisions,
empirical evidence does show that courts have been willing to apply more exacting
scrutiny to pay decisions at least episodically. This suggests that courts are willing
and able to play a more significant role in this area. But they just need the right
prompts. Moreover, compensation practices likely benefit from state regulation,
which may allow for greater flexibility in pay practices. However, state courts’
enforcement of fiduciary duty law is instrumental to that regulation and flexibility.
Indeed, shareholders’ push for federal intervention may have stemmed from their
dissatisfaction with state accountability mechanisms. From this perspective, the
best way to ensure that states, and by extension corporations, can be laboratories
for fostering healthy innovation (at least some of the time), is to ensure that state
courts do a more robust job of policing those laboratories.

